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Civil society’s voice in the settlement of 
International Economic Disputes*
Brigitte Stern**
IT Is WELL KnOWn ThAT ThE vOICE OF CIvIL sOCIETY is 
increasingly being heard in international circles. The latest trend is for the 
“activism” of civil society no longer to be limited to the traditional area of 
human rights, but also embrace the area of international economic relations. 
Civil society is not content with just demonstrating in the street, but is also bent 
upon making its way into the courtroom. The problems dealt with under the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the north American Free Trade Agreement 
(nAFTA) and the International Centre for settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICsID) are often social challenges, and it is hardly surprising that civil society 
should want to have its say whenever public-interest issues arise.1
* I would like to thank hélène hamant for her invaluable help in editing and finalizing this article in 
its first stage. My greatest thanks go also to Peter C. hansen, who has provided a meticulous review of the 
English language usage and has done fantastic editing work at the final stage.
** Professor of International Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-sorbonne; Former Director, 
CERDIn-Paris I, Centre of Research in International Law; Professor, Graduate Institute of International 
studies, Geneva; Judge, United nations Administrative Tribunal (UnAT) and Administrative Tribunal of 
the Bank for International settlements (ATBIs).
1 For a general approach to the question of the role of nGOs and amicus curiae, see D. shelton, “The 
Participation of nongovernmental Organizations in International Proceedings,” 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 611 
(1994); R. Ranjeva, “Les organisations non-gouvernementales et la mise en œuvre du droit international,” 
270 Collected Courses of the hague Academy of International Law 10 (1997); h. Ascensio, “L’amicus 
curiae devant les juridictions internationales,” 4 Rev. gén. de dr. int’l pub. 897 (2001); Ph. sands, “Le droit 
international, le praticien et les acteurs non étatiques,” in h. Ghérari and s. szurek (eds.), L’émergence de 
la société civile internationale—vers la privatisation du droit international, 85–103, Paris, Pedone (2003), 
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In this context, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, in which non-
governmental organizations (nGOs) play a key role—nobody has forgotten 
seattle!—started the trend and left the door wide open for private persons 
to file amicus curiae briefs in inter-state trade disputes.2 This was the point 
of departure for an astounding development, which will be described below. 
Also to be analyzed is the continuing extension of the case law started by the 
WTO from as far back as 1998,3 in a form much like concentric circles.4 
Developments within the WTO, nAFTA and ICsID will be sequentially 
analyzed before comments are made on the creation and evolution of 
international economic law.
no attempt shall be made here to define who may be included in the category 
of “friends of the court.” It is better this way because, by definition, it is not 
possible to predict who could one day become your friend. Catherine Kessedjian 
noted that it was clear that tribunals could not identify beforehand who would 
better be able to submit information that would help to resolve the dispute.5 
Therefore, it will not be ascertained here if enterprises as well as nGOs can 
Cahiers internationaux 18. See also on the question of third-party involvement in legal proceedings 
generally, E. Jouannet, “Quelques perspectives théoriques : incertitudes sur le tiers et désordres de la 
justice internationale,” in h. Ruiz Fabri and J.-M. sorel (eds.), Le tiers à l’instance devant les juridictions 
internationales, 255–263, Paris, Pedone (2006).
2 Amici curiae have been accepted at the level of panels and in the Appellate Body, first for private 
natural persons and legal entities, and then for non-party states or third-party states.
3 For my written work on this subject, in French and in English, with numerous bibliographical 
references, see “L’intervention des tiers dans le contentieux de l’OMC,” 2 Rev. gén. de dr. int’l pub. 
219 (2003); “The Intervention of Private Entities and states as ‘Friends of the Court’ in WTO Dispute 
settlement Proceedings,” in P. Macrory, A. Appleton and M. Plummer, The World Trade Organization: 
Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, vol. I, chap. 32, 427–458, new York, springer (2005); “The 
Emergence of non-state Actors in International Commercial Disputes through WTO Appellate Body 
Case Law,” in G. sacerdoti, A. Yanovich and J. Bohanes (eds.), The WTO at 10: The Role of the Dispute 
settlement system 372–385, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2006).
4 This subject is very topical in view of the numerous recent publications devoted to this theme. See 
in particular the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT), T. Treves (ed.), “Civil society, 
International Courts and Compliance Bodies,” The hague, T.M.C. Asser Press (2005); C. Kessedjian, 
“La nécessité de généraliser l’institution de l’amicus curiae dans le contentieux privé international,” in 
h.-P. Mansel, Th. Pfeiffer et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Erik Jayme, Band 1, 403–408, Munich, sellier 
(2004); and by the same author, “sir Kenneth Bailey Memorial Lecture: Dispute Resolution in a Complex 
International society,” 29 Melb. Univ. L. Rev. 3–21 (2005) (hereinafter Kessedjian, “sir Kenneth”); 
J.-F. Flauss, “Les organisations non gouvernementales devant les juridictions internationales compétentes 
dans le domaine de la protection des droits de l’homme,” in G. Cohen-Jonathan and J.-F. Flauss (eds.), 
Les organisations non gouvernementales et le droit international des droits de l’homme 71–101, The 
hague, Bruylant (2005); L. Bartholomeusz, “The Amicus Curiae before International Courts and 
Tribunals,” in non-state Actors and International Law 209–286, The hague, Kluwer (2002); G. Canivet, 
“L’amicus curiae en France et aux Etats-Unis,” Rev. de jur. comm., 99–113 (March-April 2005); F. Grisel 
and J. E. vinuales, L’admission d’amici curiae dans le cadre de l’arbitrage d’investissement : Analyse et 
sources, Geneva, 2008, Collection Etudes et travaux de l’Institut des hautes études internationales et du 
développement (hEI) (hereinafter Grisel and vinuales); P. Friedland, “The Amicus Role in International 
Arbitration,” in L. Mistelis and J. Lew (eds.), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration 321–328, 
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be friends of the court,6 nor whether to exclude or include intergovernmental 
organizations—even if it appears that to date there have been few proceedings 
in which the latter have asked to intervene as amici curiae.7 It should however 
be noted that ICsID recently received a petition for amicus curiae participation 
from the European Commission, in two cases involving the interpretation of 
European law and of the Energy Charter Treaty.8
It bears noting that when examining the role of amici curiae, a number 
of writers have objected to their designation as such because in their view it 
does not reflect the true meaning of their role. One has only to cite Alain 
Prujiner, who became interested in the solution adopted in the nAFTA cases 
which will be examined in this study, and in this regard pointed out that “the 
term was badly chosen because there was no court and they were not friends 
of any court. They were rather intervenors who wished to emphasize a point 
of view other than those of the state Party and the Claimant, a point of view 
that expressed the position of other individuals or groups having an interest 
in the issues at stake in the case.”9 This appears to be a rather gratuitous 
criticism of a Latin expression that is widely used and has become part of 
the language of national and international law. If it is true that the friends 
of the court present a point of view different from those of the two parties, 
The hague, Kluwer (2006); A. Mourre, “Are Amicus Curiae the Proper Response to the Public’s Concerns 
on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?”, L. and Prac. of Int’l Cts. and Tribs., vol. 5, no. 2, 257–271, 
The hague, nijhoff (2006).
5 C. Kessedjian, “L’amicus curiae,” Keynote speech, xvIIth Congress of the International Academy 
of Comparative Law 13–14 (Utrecht, July 16–22, 2006) (document provided by the author, to whom I 
am grateful, publication pending) (hereinafter Kessedjian, “L’amicus curiae”).
6 C. Kessedjian noted that not everyone has agreed on the definition to be given to this concept of 
“civil society.” For example, according to the documents consulted, businesses were either to be considered 
as a part of civil society or, on the contrary, to be excluded from being participants in a market society 
side-by-side with civil society. See “sir Kenneth” supra note 4, at 5.
7 It would seem particularly appropriate, however, that an intergovernmental organization under whose 
aegis an international treaty was adopted should intervene in legal proceedings where the interpretation 
of that treaty is at issue. For a suggestion along these lines concerning the 1980 hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, see L. silberman, “Interpreting the hague Abduction 
Convention: In search of a Global Jurisprudence”, new York University Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Papers, paper 18, at 32 (2006). See also the remark made by L. Boisson de Chazournes during 
a discussion transcribed in “Transparency, Amicus Curiae Briefs and Third Party Rights—Discussion 
session,” 5 J. World Invest. & Trade 341, 342 (2004) (stating that “[i]n our international system, we 
have actors which should play a better role in promoting public-interest issues, and these are the public 
international organizations”).
8 AeS Summit Generation Limited and AeS-Tisza erömü Kft. v. republic of Hungary, ICsID Case no. 
ARB/07/22; electrabel S.A. v. republic of Hungary, ICsID Case no. ARB/07/19.
9 A. Prujiner, “L’arbitrage unilatéral : un coucou dans le nid de l’arbitrage conventionnel?”, Rev. de 
l’arb. 4, at 86 (2005). See also what M. Mendelson had to say on the same subject in a discussion transcribed 
in 5 J. World Invest. & Trade 2, at 346–347 (2004), wherein he stated with regard to industry or trade union 
organizations that “[t]hey are not there as friends of the court. They are there as friends of themselves,” and 
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they may nevertheless be considered as friends of the court since their role 
is precisely to help the court determine, in the general circumstances of the 
case, whether the applicant or the defendant should win. For the purposes 
of this paper, therefore, I will use, as many other authors, this widely used 
expression.
I. ThE EvOLUTIOn OF ThE APPROACh TO AMICUS CUrIAe 
BRIEFs In ThE WTO COnTExT
This question of amicus curiae briefs has evolved over time in the field of 
international trade disputes.
During the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) period, some 
documents of this type were in fact submitted to the secretariat, but they were 
never taken into consideration by panel members, who stuck to the principle 
that the GATT dispute settlement system was for states only. The same solution 
was adopted when the WTO dispute settlement mechanism began to operate. 
Thus, in the Gasoline and Hormones cases, amicus curiae briefs submitted to the 
panels were disregarded in accordance with previous practice from the GATT 
period. however, international society has evolved to such an extent,10 that this 
policy of abstention has ceased to be viable.
It should be recalled that the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (DsM) 
has several players:
•	 The	 Dispute	 Settlement	 Body	 (DSB),	 which	 is	 otherwise	 known	 as	
the WTO Council, which is composed of representatives of all WTO 
Member states, sitting as an adjudicative body. This body appoints the 
members of the Appellate Body and adopts the Reports of the panels and 
of the Appellate Body;
•	 The	non-permanent	panels,	 to	whom	States	 submit	 their	 international	
trade disputes, and of which the members may but need not be chosen 
from a list drawn up by the secretary General of the WTO; and
•	 The	 permanent	 Appellate	 Body	 composed	 of	 seven	members	 who	 are	
broadly representative of the membership of the WTO, who have 
demonstrated expertise in law, and who must perform their functions 
impartially.
with regard to nGOs that “[a]gain they are not friends of the court. They may think that they are friends of 
the public interest or of the interests of a particular group of victims which are not represented.”
10 With regard to the diversification of actors in international relations, see B. stern, “Etats et 
souveraineté : la souveraineté de l’Etat face à la mondialisation,” in Y. Michaud, Université de tous les 
savoirs, Qu’est-ce que la société ? 828–839, Paris, Odile Jacob (2000).
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Under this multi-stage mechanism, there has been a tremendous growth in 
the admittance of impartial briefs in inter-state WTO proceedings.11
A. Amicus Curiae Briefs before WTO Panels
The turning point came with the Shrimp-Turtle case. having received amicus 
curiae briefs from environmental protection nGOs, the Panel, on the basis of a 
literal reading of Article 13 of the Dispute settlement Understanding (DsU),12 
refused to take them into consideration as directly submitted briefs, while 
allowing them to be attached to the parties’ submissions.13 It considered that, 
in accordance with the text of Article 13 of the DsU, amicus curiae briefs could 
only be submitted at the Panel’s own request,14 and it declared that “accepting 
non-requested information from non-governmental sources would be, in our 
opinion, incompatible with the provisions of the DsU as currently applied.”15
The Appellate Body rejected this analysis,16 stating that “authority to seek 
information is not properly equated with a prohibition on accepting information 
which has been submitted without having been requested by a panel. A panel 
has the discretionary authority either to accept and consider, or to reject, 
information and advice submitted to it, whether requested by a panel or not.”17
11 For bibliographical references additional to those mentioned in my articles cited supra at note 3, 
see L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Transparency and Amicus Curiae Briefs,” 5 J. World Invest. & Trade 2, 
333–336 (2004); R. s. Martha, “Capacity to sue and Be sued under WTO Law,” 3 World Trade Rev. 
27 (2004) (hereinafter Martha); M. Matsushita, “Transparency, Amicus Curiae Briefs and Third Parties 
Rights,” 5 J. World Invest. & Trade 2, 329–332 (2004); M. slotboom, “Participation of nGOs Before the 
WTO and EC Tribunals: Which Court is the Better Friend?” 5 World Trade Rev. 69 (2006).
12 DsU Article 13: Right to seek Information.
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual 
or body which it deems appropriate. however, before a panel seeks such information or 
advice from any individual or body within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the 
authorities of that Member. A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by 
a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate. Confidential 
information which is provided shall not be revealed without formal authorization from the 
individual, body or authorities of the Member providing the information.
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain 
their opinion on certain aspects on the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning 
a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request an 
advisory report in writing from an expert review group.
13 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Panel, 
WT/Ds58/R (WTO, May 15, 1998) (hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle).
14 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 13, at para. 7.8 (noting that “pursuant to Article 13 of the DsU, the 
initiative to seek information and to select the source of information rests with the Panel”).
15 Id.
16 United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate 
Body, AB-1998–4, WT/Ds58/AB/R (WTO, 1998).
17 Id. at para. 108 (emphasis in original).
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however, inasmuch as the Panel had allowed the United states to attach the 
nGOs’ briefs to its own submission, the Appellate Body considered that this 
was a means that the Panel could have used to obtain certain information from 
nGOs. It also pointed out that the Panel had given the other countries two 
additional weeks to respond, which meant that the way in which the nGOs’ 
submissions had been taken into account had not infringed due process.
Thus, the conclusion of the Appellate Body was clear:
We find, and so hold, that the Panel erred in its legal interpretation that 
accepting non-requested information from non-governmental sources 
is incompatible with the provisions of the DsU. At the same time, we 
consider that the Panel acted within the scope of its authority under 
Articles 12 and 13 of the DsU in allowing any party to the dispute to 
attach the briefs by non-governmental organizations, or any portion 
thereof, to its own submissions.18
since this decision, many amicus curiae briefs have been submitted to 
panels, and the principled freedom of the panels has not again been called into 
question. This freedom has been used to accept amicus curiae briefs, to reject 
them while giving reasons for their rejection (e.g. late submission or unnecessary 
duplication), and, finally, to reject them without the least word of explanation.
B. Amicus Curiae Briefs before the WTO Appellate Body
The accessibility of the Appellate Body to amicus curiae briefs directly 
addressed to it has developed more gradually.
The question first arose in Shrimp-Turtle when the United states attached 
to its submission three “independent” nGOs’ briefs, to which all the appellees 
objected. In addition to the arguments already put forward in connection with 
the submission of such documents to the Panel, a further claim was made by the 
appellees, namely that taking the briefs into consideration would be incompatible 
with the very essence of the appeal procedure, as according to Article 17.6 of the 
DsU an appeal should be limited “to issues of law covered in the Panel Report.” 
Indeed, although only issues of law are argued before the Appellate Body, and 
one would expect that members of this body, chosen for their competence, 
would not need to have recourse to nGOs to interpret legal rules, the Appellate 
Body decided to accept for its consideration the information provided by the 
nGOs without distinguishing between the different ways of submitting the 
briefs, and without really explaining the legal basis for its decision.
18 Id. at para. 110.
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Even by adopting a flexible interpretation, as it did in connection with the 
independent briefs submitted at the panel level, the Appellate Body certainly 
had greater difficulty in finding a legal basis for accepting non-requested amicus 
curiae briefs. At the panel level, DsU Article 13 refers to the possibility of seeking 
information “from any individual or body which it deems appropriate,” whereas 
there is no equivalent article for the Appellate Body, and under Rule 28(1) of 
the Working Procedures for Appellate review, the Appellate Body may request 
additional submissions only “from any participant or third participant.”
Even if the Appellate Body did not say in so many words that it could 
accept directly submitted amicus curiae briefs, it did implicitly accept such a 
document. It should also be borne in mind that although the final version of the 
document was in fact directly submitted to the Appellate Body, the first version 
had been appended to the U.s. submission. Thus, it was not possible to predict 
with any certainty what the Appellate Body’s future position would be.
The matter was clarified in a subsequent case. In United States-Carbon Steel, 
the Appellate Body explicitly considered that it had discretionary authority 
to accept amicus curiae briefs. In this case, certain submissions by industry 
associations (i.e. the American Iron and steel Institute and the specialty steel 
Industry of north America) which had been rejected by the Panel for being late 
were resubmitted to the Appellate Body.
having failed to explain the legal basis for accepting a directly submitted 
amicus curiae brief in the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Appellate Body finally did so 
in the United States-Carbon Steel case:
In considering this matter, we first note that nothing in the DsU or 
the Working Procedures specifically provides that the Appellate Body 
may accept and consider submissions or briefs from sources other 
than the participants and third participants in an appeal. On the other 
hand, neither the DsU nor the Working Procedures explicitly prohibit 
acceptance or consideration of such briefs. however, Article 17.9 of the 
DsU provides: “Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate 
Body in consultation with the Chairman of the DsB and the Director-
General, and communicated to the Members for their information.” 
This provision makes clear that the Appellate Body has broad authority 
to adopt procedural rules which do not conflict with any rules and 
procedures in the DsU or the covered agreements.19
19 United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon 
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body, AB-2000–1, WT/Ds138/
AB/R (WTO, May 10, 2000).
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In the same case, the Appellate Body clearly found that it had the discretionary 
power to accept any amicus curiae communication, explaining the legal grounds 
for its decision as follows:
We are of the opinion that we have the legal authority under the DsU 
to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we 
find it pertinent and useful to do so. In this appeal, we have not found 
it necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs filed into account in 
rendering our decision.20
More precisely, it is on the bases of Article 17.9 of the DsU and, though 
mentioned only in a footnote,21 also of Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures 
for Appellate review that the Appellate Body has agreed to accept amicus curiae 
briefs at its discretion. The Appellate Body appears on these grounds to have 
granted itself unlimited freedom of action, with the only criterion used for 
guiding its policy in this field being summed up in the phrase “if we find it 
pertinent and useful to do so.”22
however, in the subsequent Asbestos case,23 an additional step was again 
taken. Urged on by numerous nGOs, the Appellate Body, despite or perhaps 
because of heated discussions between Members of the WTO concerning the 
recent evolution in the approach concerning amicus curiae briefs, decided to 
establish “operating instructions” for the handling of amicus curiae briefs. It did 
so by adopting procedural and substantive rules for their admission, although it 
restricted these rules exclusively to the case under consideration, as is indicated 
in a letter from the Presiding Member of the Appellate Body to the Chairman 
of the DsB:
I am writing to inform you that the Division hearing the above appeal has 
decided, in the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct 
of this appeal, to adopt an additional procedure to deal with any written 
20 Id. at para. 39 (first citation) and para. 42 (second citation).
21 Id. at fn. 33. This footnote reads as follows: “In addition, Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures 
allows a division hearing an appeal to develop an appropriate procedure in certain specified circumstances 
where a procedural question arises that is not covered by the Working Procedures.”
22 Id. at para. 42.
23 european Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, Report of the 
Panel, WT/Ds135/R (WTO, 2000), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/Ds135/AB/R (2001) (hereinafter 
Asbestos). On this case, see in particular G. Zonnenkeyn, “The Appellate Body’s Communication on 
Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Asbestos Case,” J. World Trade 553–563 (2001). The letter dated november 
8, 2000 mentioned in this paragraph is cited in the Appellate Body Report at para. 51, and its reference 
is WT/Ds135/9.
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briefs received by the Appellate Body from persons other than a party or 
a third party to this dispute. This additional procedure has been adopted 
by the Division hearing this appeal for the purposes of this appeal only 
pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate review, 
and is not a new working procedure drawn up by the Appellate Body 
pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article 17 of the Understanding on rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
It seems as if the Appellate Body wanted to reach a point of no return by 
obliging governments to take a position on its reasonable attitude, now that the 
premise of the admission of amicus curiae briefs had been accepted, and which 
it no doubt hoped would not again be called into question by Members. In fact, 
the Appellate Body had very soon realized that the discretionary authority it had 
granted itself in the United States-Carbon Steel case needed to be consolidated. 
Therefore, in Asbestos, the Appellate Body laid down rules enabling it to deal 
in a transparent fashion with requests for authorization to file amicus curiae 
briefs. It considered that “the fair and orderly conduct of this appeal could be 
facilitated by the adoption of appropriate procedures, for the purposes of this 
appeal only,”24 and it accordingly proceeded to adopt such procedures.
In a document adopted on november 7, 2000, and, it should be noted, 
following consultations among all its seven members, the Appellate Body 
established an additional procedure which included a number of requirements 
to be met:
An application for leave to file such a written brief shall:
(a) be made in writing, be dated and signed by the applicant, and 
include the address and other contact details of the applicant;
(b) be in no case longer than three typed pages;
(c) contain a description of the applicant, including a statement of 
the membership and legal status of the applicant, the general objectives 
pursued by the applicant, the nature of the activities of the applicant, 
and the sources of financing of the applicant;
(d) specify the nature of the interest the applicant has in this appeal;
(e) identify the specific issues of law covered in the Panel Report and 
legal interpretations developed by the Panel that are the subject of this 
appeal, as set forth in the notice of Appeal (WT/Ds135/8) dated 23 
October 2000, which the applicant intends to address in its written 
brief;
24 Asbestos Case, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 23, at para. 50.
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(f ) state why it would be desirable, in the interests of achieving a 
satisfactory settlement of the matter at issue, in accordance with the 
rights and obligations of WTO Members under the DsU and the 
other covered agreements, for the Appellate Body to grant the applicant 
leave to file a written brief in this appeal; and indicate, in particular, in 
what way the applicant will make a contribution to the resolution of 
this dispute that is not likely to be repetitive of what has been already 
submitted by a party or third party to this dispute; and
(g) contain a statement disclosing whether the applicant has any 
relationship, direct or indirect, with any party or any third party to 
this dispute, as well as whether it has, or will, receive any assistance, 
financial or otherwise, from a party or a third party to this dispute in the 
preparation of its application for leave or its written brief.
The additional procedure provided for in the Asbestos case did more than 
merely regulate applications for authorization to file amicus curiae briefs. It also 
laid down rules for the authorized brief itself in order to save the Appellate Body 
from being deluged with submissions to read and study:
A written brief filed with the Appellate Body by an applicant granted 
leave to file such a brief shall:
(a) be dated and signed by the person filing the brief;
(b) be concise and in no case longer than 20 typed pages, including 
any appendices; and
(c) set out a precise statement, strictly limited to legal arguments, 
supporting the applicant’s legal position on the issues of law or legal 
interpretations in the Panel Report with respect to which the applicant 
has been granted leave to file a written brief.
This additional procedure was widely circulated by the secretariat on the 
WTO’s website and by e-mail to all of the nGOs on the WTO’s distribution list, 
the very day it was adopted. There were many Members of the WTO who felt that 
this amounted to an outright invitation to file amicus curiae briefs—a further step 
taken by the Appellate Body showing that it was not only willing to receive the 
submissions of nGOs, but also encouraging them and giving them its blessing.
It has to be stated, however, that despite this apparent encouragement given 
by the Appellate Body to the submission of amicus curiae briefs, and despite 
the more diversified origin of the briefs both geographically and in terms of the 
would-be amici concerned (a group including professors and university centers, 
environmental nGOs and associations of asbestos multinationals), the end 
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result was particularly disappointing since not a single authorization to submit 
an amicus curiae brief was granted in the Asbestos case.
In summary, it can be said that the Appellate Body has recognized that the 
panels have a discretionary power to allow amicus curiae briefs based on Article 
13 of the Memorandum of Understanding. similarly, the Appellate Body has 
acknowledged that it has wide discretionary powers in this regard under Article 
17.9 of the Memorandum of Understanding, and it has laid down rules for an 
additional procedure (albeit applicable only to the Asbestos case) based on Article 
16(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate review. These “precedents” were 
met with frank hostility from almost all WTO states except the United states. 
After this development, which is very favorable to nGOs, a certain conservatism 
was noted on the part of the panels25 and the Appellate Body26—perhaps a clear 
manifestation of the strong reservations to accepting said precedents that were 
expressed by numerous WTO Member states during discussions of the Dispute 
settlement Body.27 The precedents were nevertheless relied on by international 
arbitral tribunals in the context of nAFTA proceedings.28
25 For example, in the report of the Panel adopted on March 22, 2004 in United States—Investigation 
of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada (Canada v. United states), WT/
Ds277 (WTO), para. 7.10, note 75, the following words are found: “having considered carefully the 
question of how to treat that communication, and any further such communications that might be 
received, and in light of the absence of consensus among WTO Members on the question of how to treat 
amicus submissions, we decided not to accept unsolicited amicus curiae submissions in the course of this 
dispute.”
26 A point-blank but unexplained refusal is found in United States—Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (Canada v. United states), Report of 
the Appellate Body, WT/Ds257/AB/R, January 19, 2004, para. 9: “Ultimately, in this appeal, the Division 
did not find it necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs into account in rendering its decision.”
27 As noted by R. Martha, “[d]uring a special meeting, Members sent a strong signal that it must 
proceed with extreme caution with respect to how it deals with non-governmental participation in the 
dispute settlement process.” Martha, supra note 11, at 48.
28 For bibliographical references, see my article, B. stern, “L’entrée de la société civile dans l’arbitrage 
entre Etat et investisseur,” 2 Rev. de l’arb. 329–345 (2002); A. newcombe and A. Lemaire, “should Amici 
Curiae Participate in Investment Treaty Arbitration?”, 5 vindobona J. Int’l Com. L. and Arb., 1, 22–40 
(2001) (hereainafter newcombe and Lemaire); A. Bjorklund, “La participation des amici curiae dans 
les poursuites engagées en vertu des dispositions du chapitre 11 de l’ALEnA,” http://www.dfait-maeci.
gc.ca/tna-nac/participate-fr.asp; P. Dumberry, “The Admissibility of Amicus Curiae Briefs by nGOs in 
Investors-states Arbitration: The Precedent set by the Methanex Case in the Context of nAFTA Chapter 
11 Proceedings,” in non-state Actors and International Law, vol. 1, n. 3, 201–214 (2001) (hereinafter 
Dumberry); h. Mann, “Opening the Doors, at Least a Little: Comment on the Amicus Decision in 
Methanex v. United states,” 10 Rev. Euro. Comm. & Int’l Environ. L. 2, 241–245 (2002) (hereinafter 
Mann); G. A. Alvarez, “Mexican view on the Operation of nAFTA for the Resolution of Canada-U.s.-
Mexico Disputes,” 26 Can.-U.s. L. J., 219 (2000); W.W. Park, “The new Face of Investment Arbitration: 
nAFTA Chapter 11,” 28 Yale J. Int’l L. 365 (2003); Th. Wälde, “Transparency, Amicus Curiae Briefs and 
Third Party Rights,” 5 J. World Invest. & Trade 2, 337–339 (2004) (hereinafter Wälde); M. hunter and 
A. Barbuk, “non-disputing Party Interventions in Chapter 11 Arbitrations,” in T. Weiler (ed.), Investment 
Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects 151, London, Cameron (2004).
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II. ThE EvOLUTIOn OF ThE APPROACh TO AMICUS CUrIAe 
BRIEFs In ThE nAFTA COnTExT
A. The Methanex Case, The First Arbitration in which Amicus Curiae Briefs Were 
Accepted
In Methanex Corporation v. United States,29 the protection of the environment 
was at issue. Three organizations petitioned the Tribunal to be allowed to present 
amicus curiae briefs—the International Institute for sustainable Development 
(IIsD),30 Communities for a Better Environment, and the Earth Island 
Institute.31 In that particular case, a Canadian company, Methanex, claimed 
compensation from the United states in the amount of one billion U.s. dollars 
for a reduction in its profits caused by the state of California’s ban on the use of 
a gas additive known as methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) manufactured by 
the company.
Methanex was a nAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration conducted under the 
UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules.32 After a petition to file amicus curiae briefs 
29 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici 
Curiae” (January 15, 2001), http://naftalaw.org/methanex/Methanex-Amicus.Decision.pdf (hereinafter 
Methanex “Amici Curiae” Decision). It may be noted that the award on the merits was rendered on August 
3, 2005, rejecting all of Methanex’s claims and ordering it to pay approximately 4 million dollars in costs 
to the United states.
30 This is an nGO based in Canada.
31 These are American nGOs.
32 With regard to this type of arbitration, there is an abundant literature in English, and an article 
in French in the Revue de l’arbitrage. See G.n. horlick and F.A. DeBusk, “Dispute Resolution under 
nAFTA,” 27 J. World Trade, 21–41 (1993); D.M. Price, “An Overview of the nAFTA Investment 
Chapter substantive Rules and Investor-state Dispute settlement,” The International Lawyer, vol. 
27, 731 (1993); Ch. Eklund, “A Primer on the Arbitration of nAFTA Chapter Eleven Investor state 
Disputes,” 11 J. Int. Arb. 135 (1994); K.L. Oelstrom, “A Treaty for the Future: The Dispute settlement 
Mechanisms of nAFTA,” 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 783 (1994); G.L. sandrino, “The nAFTA Investment 
Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective,” 27 vand. J. Transnat’l L. 
259 (1994); G.n. horlick and A. Marti, “nAFTA Chapter 11B: A Right of Action to Enforce Market 
Access through Investment,” 14 J. Int. Arb. 43 (1997); J.A. vanduzer, “notes and Comments. Investor-
state Dispute settlement under nAFTA Chapter 11: The shape of Things to Come?”, Can. YB Int’l L. 
263 (1997); L.L. herman, “settlement of International Trade Disputes—Challenges to sovereignty—A 
Canadian Perspective,” 24 Can.-U.s. L. J. 121 (1998); D. MacDonald, “Chapter 11 of nAFTA: What 
are the Implications for sovereignty?”, 24 Can.-U.s. L. J. 281 (1998); J. soloway, “nAFTA’s Chapter 
11—The Challenge of Private Party Participation,” J. Int’l Arb. 1 (1999); J.C. Thomas, “Investor-state 
Arbitration under nAFTA Chapter 11,” Can. YB Int’l L. 99 (1999); A. Lemaire, “Le nouveau visage de 
l’arbitrage entre Etat et investisseur étranger: le chapitre 11 de l’ALEnA,” Rev. de l’arb. 43 (2001); M. 
Kinnear, “Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-state Dispute settlement,” Presentation, 
symposium co-organized by ICsID, the OECD and UnCTAD, “Making the Most of International 
Investment Agreements” (Paris, December 12, 2005), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/25/36979626.
pdf (hereinafter Kinnear); L. Mistelis, “Confidentiality and Third Party Participation. UPS v. Canada and 
Methanex Corporation v. United States,” Arb. Int’l, vol. 21, no. 2, 205–225, LCIA (2005).
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was submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal,33 the Tribunal asked the opinions of the 
two parties (i.e. the Methanex company and the United states) as well as those 
of Canada and Mexico, the other two states Parties to the nAFTA treaty, as it 
believed that the admissibility of the amici curiae briefs raised important legal 
questions that “touch upon important general principles directly affecting the 
future conduct of these arbitration proceedings.”34
The nGOs in fact demanded total access to the proceedings, which implied 
several requests—to be permitted to make written submissions, to attend the 
hearings and make oral submissions, and to have access to all of the documents 
exchanged between the parties, i.e. the memorials, counter-memorials, annexes, 
evidence, etc. such demands were unprecedented in an investment-related 
arbitration between a state and a private investor. such an arbitration is, at 
least in theory, still based on the consent of both parties, despite it being well 
known that the consensual aspect has considerably diminished in recent years, 
so that this type of arbitration increasingly seems like a quasi-obligatory dispute 
settlement process.35
The arguments from the “friends of the court” were many. First, they insisted 
on “the immense public importance of the case,” and they then put forward 
a more “political” argument based on a broad perspective of international 
economic relations: “participation of an amicus would allay public disquiet as 
to the closed nature of arbitration proceedings under Chapter 11 of nAFTA.”36 
Methanex for its part disapproved of the intervention of other private parties in 
the proceedings, because it had complained about the environmental protection 
measures having led to a decline in its profits, while the aim of the environmental 
nGOs was to defend these measures.
This tension between different private interests in a dispute settlement 
mechanism officially putting on the same plane the state and private persons—
in the instant case foreign investors acting under the nAFTA Chapter 11 
provisions for the protection of international investments—also exists in the 
WTO’s dispute settlement arrangements. The latter is certainly an inter-state 
mechanism, but one in which opposing private interests also seek to make 
their voices heard. Under nAFTA, investors—private sector players—have 
used the arbitration mechanism under Chapter 11 to object to environmental 
33 This Arbitral Tribunal was comprised of William Rowley, Warren Christopher and v.v. veeder, 
President.
34 Methanex “Amici Curiae” Decision, supra note 29, at para. 4.
35 On certain aspects of this question, see B. stern, “Un coup d’arrêt à la marginalisation du 
consentement dans l’arbitrage international (A propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 1er juin 
1999),” Rev. de l’arb. 403 (2000).
36 Methanex “Amici Curiae” Decision, supra note 29, at para. 5.
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regulations that have caused their profits to decline. In so doing, they have been 
opposing environmental nGOs—other private players—who now go so far as 
to advocate a modification of the system, suggesting, for example, the need for 
the government of the state against which arbitration proceedings have been 
brought by private investors to accept the arbitration on a case-by-case basis.37 
Indeed, Meg Kinnear stated that “[s]ome analysts have expressed concern 
that amicus participation in the investor-state context has been exclusively 
progovernment and anti-investor,” adding that she did not share this point 
of view because, according to her, “this criticism is unfounded and … amicus 
participation has been from a variety of perspectives.”38
It was no surprise that the United states—and Canada, which joined forces 
with it39—were favorable to the admission of amicus curiae briefs, because such 
had been their invariable policy. Mexico, meanwhile, followed the stance of the 
developing countries, opposing such a move. Faced with these irreconcilable points 
of view, the Arbitral Tribunal decided to accept the amicus curiae briefs based on 
the reasoning set out below. In doing so, it made repeated references at each step 
of the way to the above-mentioned rulings of the WTO Appellate Body.
The Arbitral Tribunal began by noting that nothing in the rules governing 
its procedure, i.e. neither the nAFTA Chapter 11 Rules nor the UnCITRAL 
Rules of Procedure, “either expressly confers upon the Tribunal the power to 
accept amicus submissions or expressly provides that the Tribunal shall have no 
such power.”40
As the Tribunal found no clear directive in its constitutive document to 
determine what its power was, it referred to Article 15 of the UnCITRAL 
Rules of Procedure, which gave it wide powers in the conduct of arbitration 
proceedings. It held that “in the Tribunal’s view, its receipt of written submissions 
from a person other than the Disputing Parties is not equivalent to adding that 
person as a party to the arbitration,”41 which it is not empowered to do. It 
added, as if to buttress this reasoning, that in the United States-Carbon Steel case 
settled under the WTO, “[t]he distinction between Parties to an arbitration and 
their right to make submissions and a third party person having no such right 
was adopted by the WTO Appellate Body…. For present purposes, this WTO 
37 six nGOs jointly filed a report to the United states Trade Representative (UsTR) in september 
2001 proposing a modification of the existing procedures. These nGOs were the Center for Environmental 
Law, the Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of the Earth, the natural Resources Defense Council, Pacific 
Environment, and the sierra Club.
38 Kinnear, supra note 32, at 7.
39 This was apparently done after “considerable internal negotiations and deliberations.” Mann, supra 
note 28, at 242.
40 Methanex “Amici Curiae” Decision, supra note 29, at para. 24.
41 Id. at para. 30.
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practice demonstrates that the scope of a procedural power can extend to the 
receipt of written submissions from non-Parties third persons.”42 Taking the 
parallel even further, the Arbitral Tribunal gave due consideration to the two 
pertinent articles, namely Article 15 of the UnCITRAL Rules and Article 17.6 
of the WTO Memorandum of Agreement:
[T]he Appellate Body there found that it had power to accept amicus 
submissions under Article 17.9 of the Dispute settlement Understanding 
to draw up working procedures. That procedural power is significantly 
less broad than the power accorded to this Tribunal under Article 15(1) to 
conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.43
having established an underlying legal basis for exercising its power, the 
Arbitral Tribunal widened its comments to some extent in order to emphasize 
that insofar as questions of public interest had been raised, its decision would be 
taken against the background of current international relations: “In this regard, 
the Tribunal’s willingness to receive amicus submissions might support the 
process in general and this arbitration in particular, whereas a blanket refusal 
could do positive harm.”44
Whatever the overall political impact, the Arbitral Tribunal held in this 
decision that it had the power to accept amicus curiae briefs in investor-state 
arbitration even if one of the parties was not in agreement. It is the author’s view that 
this is a new marginalization of the parties’ consent, which provides the basis for 
the arbitration process. It should be noted, however, that nGO participation was 
limited in this case to written submissions. The nGOs were not authorized to 
attend hearings or present oral arguments. This was the case only because there 
is a specific UnCITRAL arbitration rule providing for hearings in camera as a 
general rule.45 The door has therefore been left open for them to participate in 
the absence of such a general rule. Likewise, it was considered that nGOs were 
not permitted to access all of the documents related to the arbitration. There 
again, however, this was for the specific reason that there was a confidentiality 
agreement between the parties covering the documents exchanged by the parties 
during the arbitration process.
Furthermore, although the Tribunal laid down “the general principle 
permitting written submissions from third persons,”46 it did not immediately 
42 Id. at para. 33.
43 Id.
44 Id. at para. 49.
45 “hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise.” UnCITRAL Rules of 
Arbitration, Article 25(4).
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exercise its power because it believed that it should draw up a clearer, more 
detailed procedure:
Weighting all the factors, the Tribunal considers that it could be 
appropriate to allow amicus written submissions from these Petitioners. 
Whilst the Tribunal is at present minded to allow the Petitioners to 
make such submissions at a later stage of these arbitration proceedings, 
it is premature now for the Tribunal finally to decide the question at 
this relatively early stage. The Tribunal intends first to consider with 
the Disputing Parties procedural limitations as to the timing, form and 
content of the Petitioners’ submissions.
In reality, the procedural framework was not decided upon in conjunction 
with the disputing parties, even if they had accepted the principle of the 
intervention of amici curiae. It was rather drawn up by the states Parties to 
nAFTA in their statement of Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission 
(FTC) dated October 7, 2003. Based on this procedure, two applications for 
leave to file amicus curiae briefs were then presented, as explained by the Tribunal 
in the Final Award in Methanex:47
In accordance with the procedures of the FTC statement, as put in 
place by the Tribunal with the agreement of the Disputing Parties, 
the Tribunal received two applications for permission to file a non-
disputing party submission: (i) the application for amicus curiae status 
by International Institute for sustainable Development dated 9th March 
2004, and (ii) the application of non-disputing parties for leave to file 
a written submission by Earthjustice on behalf of Bluewater network, 
Communities for a Better Environment and Center for International 
Environmental Law, also dated 9th March 2004. In each case, as provided 
in the FTC statement, the application was accompanied by the written 
submission that the amicus curiae sought to submit to the Tribunal. By 
letter of 26th March 2004, the UsA submitted that the Tribunal should 
grant the permission requested by the potential amici, whilst by letter of 
the same date Methanex indicated that it did not object to the granting 
of such permission by the Tribunal.48
46 Methanex “Amici Curiae” Decision, supra note 29, at para. 37.
47 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award (August 3, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/51052.pdf
48 Id. at Part II, Chapter C, para. 28.
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Interestingly, the Tribunal made a reference in its reasoning to an argument 
presented by IIsD:
The International Institute for sustainable Development (IIsD), in its 
carefully reasoned Amicus submission, also disagrees with Methanex’s 
contention that “trade law approaches can simply be transferred to 
investment law.”49
In closing, it bears noting that the Arbitral Tribunal’s acceptance of amicus 
curiae briefs relied heavily on the admission of interventions from disinterested 
parties under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and the reasoning 
followed by the WTO’s Appellate Body.
B. Confirmation of Acceptance of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the UPs Case
The first step taken in Methanex was confirmed by a second step taken in 
the UPS (United Parcel Service of America Inc.) v. Government of Canada case.50 
The UPS case was also a nAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration conducted under the 
UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules. It involved a worldwide express delivery service 
company, UPs, which instituted proceedings against Canada because of the 
existence in that country of a state monopoly, Canada Post, which UPs accused 
of breaching the national treatment rules laid down in nAFTA. UPs alleged 
that Canada Post had abused its monopoly in order to develop express delivery 
services that competed with the activities of UPs, and that it had benefited from 
customs facilities that were not granted to UPs. The latter therefore claimed 
160 million dollars in damages from Canada. Two Canada Post labor unions, 
namely the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the Council of Canadians, 
wanted to intervene in the case as amici curiae. In fact, the application to 
49 Id. at Part Iv, Chapter B, para. 27. See also the reference made to the amici curiae in the preface of 
the Final Award: “From this Award and from the Partial Award also, it will be evident that the Tribunal 
has relied heavily on the submissions of Counsel, who were assisted by many others whose names do not 
appear on the transcript of the hearings. In adversarial proceedings addressing such a massive, complicated 
and difficult dispute over many years, it could not be otherwise. At the beginning of this Award, therefore, 
it is appropriate to record our appreciation of the scholarship and industry which Counsel for the 
Disputing Parties, Mexico and Canada as nAFTA Parties and the amici have deployed during these 
lengthy arbitration proceedings, together with their respective experts, assistants and other advisers.” Id. 
at para. 11 (emphasis added).
50 UPS (United Parcel Service of America Inc.) v. Government of Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae (October 17, 2001), at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/Intvent_oct.pdf (hereinafter UPS “Amici Curiae” Decision). It may be noted that the 
award on the merits was rendered on June 11, 2007, the UPs claims having been unanimously rejected 
in their entirety by the Tribunal.
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intervene as amici curiae was requested simply as an option for the unions in 
the event that the main application—that the two trade unions could become 
parties to the case—was rejected. This illustrates the fact that the submission of 
an amicus curiae brief can play basically the same role as an entity’s intervention 
as a party in a dispute.
The unions’ amici curiae intervention was supposed to be extremely broad 
because the two trade unions had petitioned the Tribunal requesting, first, the 
right that all procedural documents generated by the parties and the Arbitral 
Tribunal be provided to them, second, the right to make submissions concerning 
the place of arbitration, and third, the right to make submissions concerning 
the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal and the arbitrability of the dispute.
The arguments in support of their application to intervene in the proceedings, 
either as parties or as “friends of the court,” were, first, their direct interest in 
the settlement of the dispute, the solution of which could impact on them 
negatively and second, their “interest in the broader public policy implications 
of the dispute.”51 From the unions’ point of view, it was the very concept of 
postal services as well as of the public service in general that could be affected 
by the arbitral decision, since according to them, “this dispute is not essentially 
private in character, but rather is likely to have far reaching impacts on a broad 
diversity of non party interests.”52 The trade unions raised two further concerns. 
The first was their desire to see the seat of the arbitration located in Canada “to 
ensure judicial oversight by the appropriate Canadian court of these proceedings 
in accordance with Canadian constitutional principles and the rule of law.”53 
This was a manifestation of the concern that can arise when certain social 
organizational issues are withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the domestic legal 
system in order to have them entrusted to the decision of international trade 
arbitrators, who are not necessarily sensitive to public policy concerns prevailing 
in the local legal environment. The second concern raised by the unions was their 
determination “to address the lack of transparency that has historically attended 
international arbitral processes.”54 Finally, the unions urged the Arbitral Tribunal 
to grant them fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international laws 
governing the protection of human rights and workers’ rights.
Part of the Tribunal’s reasoning dealt with the first application of the trade 
unions, which was to be granted party status in the proceedings. It should be 
noted here, without entering into the details of the arguments made in relation 
to the joinder of a party, that in advocating their right to fair and equitable 
51 Id. at 3.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 4.
54 Id.
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treatment under the law, the two unions argued that “investor-state claims 
can be seen more analogous to the judicial review applications than to private 
contract disputes.”55 This would seem to support the notion that the “freedom 
of parties to arrange their own affairs” based on a concept of arbitration as 
an institution performing a private function should be set aside in cases of 
arbitration without privity,56 which instead fulfills a public function and should 
not prevent the intervention of interested parties. The Arbitral Tribunal did 
not, however, go beyond its mandate by agreeing to add new parties on its own 
authority in an arbitration that had been submitted to it based on the consent 
of the two original parties. According to the Tribunal, “[t]he disputing parties 
have consented to arbitration only in respect of the specified matters and only 
with each other and with no other person.”57
having refused to grant party status to the two trade unions, the Tribunal 
turned its attention to their alternative petition, which was to be granted “friends 
of the court” status. While invoking and approving in part the position adopted 
previously by the Arbitral Tribunal in Methanex, the trade unions criticized that 
body for adopting an excessively narrow notion of what was involved in an amici 
curiae intervention. In particular, it was the unions’ view that friends of the court 
ought not only to be able to make written submissions, but should also be able 
to attend hearings and have access to all documents related to the arbitration.
The two disputing parties—UPs and Canada—presented briefs seeking to 
prevent the unions’ intervention as amici curiae even though it was recognized by 
UPs that the Tribunal did perhaps have the power to accept amicus curiae briefs, 
and by Canada that the Tribunal certainly had a discretionary power in this 
regard. The two parties nevertheless believed that questions concerning the place 
of arbitration, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and procedure in general should 
not justify the submission of amicus curiae briefs. UPs in particular drew the 
attention of the Tribunal to the dangers of leaving the door wide open for amici 
curiae briefs, as this risked rendering arbitral proceedings unmanageable. For its 
part, Canada announced its “appreciation of the contribution that transparency 
brings to building confidence in the investor-state dispute settlement process.”58
55 Id. at 12.
56 This is an expression coined by J. Paulsson in “Arbitration without Privity,” ICsID Rev. 232 
(1995).
57 UPS “Amici Curiae” Decision, supra note 50, at 16. The Arbitral Tribunal believed in particular that 
Article 15 of the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules—the veritable Magna Carta of international commercial 
arbitration—which recognizes the right of the Parties to due process, could not be interpreted as conferring 
the right of participation upon non-parties: “It does not itself confer power to adjust jurisdiction to widen 
the matter before it by adding as parties persons additional to those which have mutually agreed to its 
jurisdiction or by including subject matter in its arbitration additional to that which the parties have 
agreed to confer.” Id. at 17.
58 Id. at 21.
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The United states and Mexico, like Canada and Mexico in Methanex, 
were called upon in their capacity as states Parties to nAFTA and adopted 
unsurprising positions. The United states favored the admission of amicus curiae 
briefs while Mexico argued that the Arbitral Tribunal did not have the power 
to accept such briefs. The latter, in particular, stated that the concept of amicus 
curiae was unknown in Mexico and that “[c]oncepts and procedures alien to its 
legal tradition and which were not agreed to … should not be imported into 
nAFTA dispute settlement proceedings.”59
Referring frequently to the decision adopted in Methanex, the Arbitral 
Tribunal agreed in principle that communications from the two trade unions 
should be admitted, and that they should be able to file written communications 
but not attend hearings. In the latter respect, as had been the case in Methanex, 
the Tribunal cited Article 25(4) of the UnCITRAL Rules, stipulating that 
hearings should be held in camera. The Tribunal seemed to wish to go beyond 
its predecessor in the Methanex case, however, since it added that “[t]he privacy 
of the hearing is perhaps to be distinguished from confidentiality or availability 
of documents.”60 It remained vague on the criteria to be used to determine when 
arbitral documents should be provided to amici curiae, being content merely to 
indicate that the principle of transparency could result in the transmission of 
certain documents while others ought to remain confidential.
For practical reasons, the Tribunal did not want to overburden the 
arbitral process and indicated that it would limit the length of authorized 
communications, albeit without giving any details at that stage. The Tribunal 
further appears to have made a Freudian slip when it added that “[t]he third 
parties would not have the opportunity to call witnesses (given the effect of 
article 25 (4)).”61 Although the Tribunal was relatively silent on the exact form 
that the amici curiae interventions would take, and affirmed its power to admit 
such briefs, it did not believe that they would be appropriate in procedural 
matters. nevertheless, the Tribunal’s “profession of faith” in favor of amicus 
curiae briefs is noteworthy. It was based on systemic considerations and the 
desire for “transparency,” a buzz word that seems to open the doors to the 
arbitral process. The basic idea seems to be that the international system of 
investor-state arbitration has changed fundamentally, the result being that 
amicus curiae briefs must be accepted in investor-state disputes. such disputes 
are not seen purely as commercial disputes, but rather as having much more at 
stake. According to the Tribunal in UPS, “[s]uch proceedings are not now, if 
59 Id. at 23.
60 Id. at 26.
61 Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
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they ever were, to be equated to the standard run of international commercial 
arbitration between private parties.”62
The matter arose again at the merits stage, when in an order dated April 
4, 2003, the hearings were opened up with the consent of the parties: “In 
accordance with UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules Article 25(4), to the extent 
the Disputing Parties have agreed as recorded in this order, the hearings in this 
arbitration shall not be held in camera.”63 Then, once the Free Trade Commission 
laid down broad guidelines for amicus curiae interventions in October 2003 in 
its statement of Interpretation, the Arbitral Tribunal specified the procedure 
applicable to such interventions in April 2004 and August 2005. Based on these 
specifications, a new joint application was submitted by the unions on October 
20, 2005. A further application was presented the same day by the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United states, albeit through a different lawyer.64
Responses to the various details required by the Tribunal before it could 
give approval to amici curiae interventions were set out in these applications: 
information on the intervening parties, their independence, their interest 
in the proceedings, and the factual and legal issues to be addressed in their 
briefs.
The unions made the following submission: “The Canadian Union of 
Postal Workers … represents approximately 46,000 operational employees 
of the Canadian Post” and has been “actively involved in the public policy 
debate about postal services,”65 while “[t]he Council of Canadians … is a 
non-governmental organization with more than 100,000 members” and “is 
strongly committed to preserving the integrity of Canadian postal services as 
public services providing high quality, reliable and affordable mail, parcel and 
courier services to all Canadians regardless of where they live.”66 The Chamber 
of Commerce’s submission for its part stated that “[t]he Chamber of Commerce 
of the United states of America … is the world’s largest business federation, 
representing an underlying membership of more than three million businesses, 
state and local chambers of commerce and professional organizations.”67 The 
two applications were accepted and the Tribunal received the two amicus curiae 
briefs.
62 Id.
63 UPS (United Parcel Service of America Inc.) v. Government of Canada, Procedural Directions and 
Order of the Tribunal, (April 4, 2003), http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_ups.htm, at para. 
14.
64 See Amicus submission – CUPE and “Council of Canadians,” and Amicus submission—Us 
Chamber of Commerce (October 20, 2005), at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_ups.htm.
65 First application, http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_ups.htm, at paras. 1 and 5.
66 Id. at paras. 7–8.
67 second application, http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_ups.htm
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C. The “routine” Use of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Glamis Case
It should be emphasized that applications for amicus curiae interventions 
are becoming increasingly frequent, as was seen recently in a nAFTA Chapter 
11 arbitration conducted under the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules between a 
Canadian company, Glamis Gold Ltd., and the United states.68
In December 2003, Glamis Gold Ltd., a Canadian precious metals mining 
company, filed an application for arbitration on behalf of its subsidiaries, Glamis 
Gold Inc. and Glamis Imperial Corporation, concerning alleged losses suffered 
at a gold mining project in California. It alleged that certain measures taken 
by the U.s. federal government and the state of California relating to open-pit 
mining were in breach of the obligations assumed by the United states under 
Chapter 11 of the nAFTA.
In this case, the Tribunal received a series of applications from organizations 
to intervene as amici curiae. The first application was filed in August 2005 by the 
Quechan Indian nation (“the Tribe”), an American Indian tribe recognized at 
the federal level.69 The Tribe, whose sacred places were located at the site where 
the gold mine conceded by the United states to Glamis was to be developed, 
wanted to intervene to protect its ancestral rights. In its application, the Tribe, 
after being required to state that it was not connected to any of the disputing 
parties, explained that “the Quechan’s interest in this nAFTA arbitration is 
multi-faceted.” It emphasized that it had “proactively tracked all of the legal, 
administrative and policy initiatives known to it, to ensure that the sacred 
places at Indian Pass would be protected to the maximum extent possible.” 
According to the Tribe, this arbitration was “one of those processes that could 
affect the integrity of the sacred area and the Tribe’s relation to it,” and “the 
manner in which this sacred area and the Tribe’s interest in it will be portrayed 
in this arbitral process is of great concern for native peoples worldwide, who 
are similarly attempting to protect their irreplaceable sacred places and ensure 
religious freedoms.” Thus, it wanted to ensure that “the sensitive and serious 
68 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States (hereinafter Glamis). Documents relating to this case can be 
found on the U.s. Department of state website at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm. It bears noting 
that this case is of particular interest because, according to two authors, “it was the first case in which the 
admissibility criteria determined by the Free Trade Commission were themselves applied. The Tribunal 
held that it was necessary to determine the question of admissibility in accordance with the principles 
laid down by the Free Trade Commission, and (contrary to the Tribunals in Methanex and UPS), without 
having to rely on the discretionary power granted to it by Article 15(1) of the UnCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.” Grisel and vinuales, supra note 4, at 19 (footnote omitted). It should be added that this remark is 
only true, however, if the entire proceeding is considered as a whole.
69 Glamis, Quechan Indian nation Application for Leave to File a non-Party submission (August 19, 
2005), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52531.pdf. The citations of the two following 
paragraphs all come from this application.
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nature of indigenous sacred areas” would in fact be taken into account not only 
in the present arbitration, but also “in all future, international proceedings.”
To ensure acceptance of its application, the Tribe argued that it could 
assist the Tribunal “in the determination of factual and legal issues by bringing 
the perspective, particular knowledge and insight that is unique to American 
tribal sovereign governments.” According to the Tribe, none of the parties to 
the arbitration could make such a contribution. Moreover, in its capacity as a 
sovereign government recognized by the United states Constitution, the Tribe 
felt it could not “be adequately represented by another sovereign: the United 
states Government,” nor, a fortiori, by the Canadian company Glamis. It has 
therefore a unique and different approach, since “the Claimant is adverse in 
interest to the Tribe, and the Respondent is not constitutionally equipped to 
speak for it.” In particular, “no party can speak with expertise or authority to the 
cultural, social or religious value of the Indian Pass area to the Tribe or the severity 
of impacts to the area and the Tribe, except for qualified members of the Tribe.” 
The Tribe put forward the “significant interest” it had in this arbitration as being 
that from time immemorial the Quechan people had occupied the region where 
the mining project was to be carried out, and that “the Indian Pass area remains 
of extremely high value to the Tribe because of its historical/cultural associations 
and its continuing ceremonial and religious values to the Quechan people.”
The Tribe’s application to submit an amicus curiae brief elicited responses 
from both the United states70 and Glamis Gold Ltd.71 On september 16, 2005, 
the Tribunal heard the issue and accepted the Tribe’s submission.72 At the end of 
september, however, another application for authorization to submit amici curiae 
briefs was jointly filed by the Friends of the Earth Canada and the Friends of the 
Earth United states,73 two not-for-profit environmental advocacy organizations.
Moreover, the sierra Club and Earthworks, two other environmental 
nGOs, addressed to the Tribunal a Request for Extension to File submissions 
in order to shift the date for filing from October 13, 2006 to november 7, 
2006, or at least October 25, 2006. The Tribunal, after emphasizing that 
70 Glamis, Response of United states of America to Application of the Quechan Indian nation 
for Leave to File a non-Party submission (september 15, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/54087.pdf
71 Glamis, Response of Glamis Gold Ltd. to Application of the Quechan Indian nation for Leave to File 
a non-Party submission (september 15, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54090.
pdf
72 Glamis, Decision on Application and submission by Quechan Indian nation (september 16, 
2005), at http://www/state/gov/documents/organization/53592.pdf
73 Glamis, Amicus Curiae Application of Friends of the Earth Canada and Friends of the Earth United 
states (september 30, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54364.pdf; Id., Amicus 
Curiae submissions of Friends of the Earth Canada and Friends of the Earth United states (september 
30, 2005), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54363.pdf
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submissions of non-disputing parties should be concise and not exceed 20 
pages, granted an extension to October 16, 2006.74 On that date, the sierra 
Club and Earthworks filed an Application for Leave to File submissions.75 The 
very same day, the Tribe, which had already filed a submission in september 
2005, filed an Application for Leave to File a supplemental Amicus Curiae 
Brief.76 It stated that “[a]s the Tribunal is aware, those initial submissions … 
were made prior to the filing of Glamis’s Memorial or the state Department’s 
Counter-Memorial in the matter. As part of those initial submissions, the Tribe 
respectfully requested that it be provided the opportunity to respond to the 
Disputing Parties’ Memorials, and other submissions, as may be necessary and 
appropriate.” Meanwhile, the national Mining Association, “a not-for-profit 
trade organization that represents the interests of the mining industry before 
each branch of the United states government and the public,” had also filed an 
Application for Leave to File submissions.77
The Tribunal had emphasized that the submissions of the non-disputing 
parties should be concise and not exceed 20 pages,78 and it ended up with five 
submissions of roughly this size. Two came from the Tribe, the first comprising 
15 pages and the second 20 pages. One came from the Friends of the Earth 
Canada and the Friends of the Earth United states with 19 pages, another 
from the sierra Club and Earthworks with 20 pages, and finally one from the 
national Mining Association with 22 pages.
If acceptance of amicus curiae submissions is intended to ensure greater 
transparency and foster a greater understanding of the social challenges involved 
in a case, it cannot be denied that this places an additional burden on parties to 
the dispute and on the Tribunal.79
74 Glamis, Request for Extension to File Application for Leave to File a non-Disputing Party 
submission and Associated submission (October 10, 2006), at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/73890.pdf
75 Glamis, Application of non-Disputing Parties for Leave to File a Written submission by sierra 
Club and Earthworks (October 16, 2006), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/74831.pdf; 
Id., submission of non-Disputing Parties sierra Club and Earthworks (October 16, 2006), at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/74832.pdf
76 Glamis, Quechan Indian nation Application for Leave to File a supplemental non-Party 
submission (October 16, 2006), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75015.pdf; Id., non-
Party supplemental submission of the Quechan Indian nation (October 16, 2006), at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/75016.pdf
77 Glamis, Application for Leave to File a non-Disputing Party submission by the national Mining 
Association (October 13, 2006), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75178.pdf; Id., non-
Disputing Party submission of the national Mining Association (October 13, 2006), at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/75179.pdf
78 Glamis, Request for Extension to File Application for Leave to File a non-Disputing Party 
submission and Associated submission, supra note 74.
79 Evidence of this is provided by the relevant documents produced in Glamis and quoted supra at 
notes 68–78 and their accompanying text.
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Without analyzing the content of the various briefs in Glamis, it is 
nevertheless interesting to present the principal arguments of the Tribe, given 
that up to now this type of intervention has not been as common as those of 
environmental advocacy or human rights nGOs.
In its written submission, the Tribe developed certain points of fact and 
of law. With respect to the former, the Tribe believed that the mining project 
threatened Quechan cultural resources and sacred places. The Tribe pointed out 
in particular that it “has utilised the Indian Pass area since time immemorial 
for religious, ceremonial and educational purposes,” that it still used it, and 
that hopefully future generations would continue to use it. With regard to the 
points of law, the Tribe described the current framework for the protection of 
indigenous cultural resources erected under domestic and international laws. 
California and the U.s. federal government had adopted legislation “to protect 
tribes and tribal cultural resources.” Moreover, according to the Tribe, “there is a 
considerable body of international pronouncement, spanning nearly fifty years, 
on cultural resource protection,” including Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. After presenting this general framework for protection, the 
Tribe developed its argument on the issues in dispute. After pointing out that 
“in its notice of arbitration, the Claimant has identified two provisions of the 
nAFTA upon which it hopes to rely: Articles 1105(1) (the ‘minimum standard 
of treatment’) and 1110 (requiring compensation for expropriation),” the Tribe 
indicated that in order to interpret those provisions, the Tribunal ought to be 
guided by the following two considerations:
•	 that	the	preservation	and	protection	of	indigenous	rights	in	ancestral	land	
is an obligation of customary international law which must be observed 
in accordance with the principle of good faith; and
•	 that	an	investor	seeking	compensation	for	an	alleged	taking	of	property	
cannot rely upon a claim to acquired rights in which no legitimate 
expectation to enjoy such rights existed.
According to the Tribe, nAFTA states Parties, while having regard for the 
treatment of investors and their investments, must also act in accordance with the 
minimum standards imposed by customary international law. It indicated that 
“communal rights to property exist for indigenous people in international law, 
above and apart from whichever of their rights in land are recognized within any 
particular domestic system of law.” It cited in support of its argument the United 
nations sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, as well as International Labour Organization Convention no. 169 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which 
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according to the Tribe “stands as a de facto restatement of the core principles 
of international law generally applicable to the conduct of states in respect of 
the rights and interests of indigenous people.” It also cited judgments rendered 
by the Inter-American Court of human Rights and the position of the Inter-
American Commission on human Rights with respect to the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.80 Concerning the interpretation 
of nAFTA Article 1110, the Tribe recalled that “many tribunals have already 
concluded that nAFTA Article 1110 is not a remedy for any investor whose 
business plans were ultimately frustrated by governmental regulation.” It ended 
its brief by explaining how an award in favor of Glamis could negatively affect 
the management of the area in question.
D. Outlook Following These Various WTO and NAFTA Decisions
Following the WTO developments discussed above, the second stage in 
which amicus curiae briefs were accepted by arbitral tribunals in foreign investor-
state arbitrations was performed under nAFTA Chapter 11 and conducted 
under the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules. At that point, some wondered if the 
acceptance of amicus curiae briefs would continue or if the trend would instead 
cease or at least slow down. Walid Ben hamida, for example, pointed out after 
examining the two nAFTA cases, Methanex81 and UPS,82 that it was not at all 
sure that the same solution would have been conceivable if other arbitration 
rules had been applicable. There are indeed rules which bring to mind Article 
15 of the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules in the Washington Convention, the 
ICsID Rules, the Additional Facility Rules, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration, and the International Commission on 
Civil status (ICCs) Regulations. however, as Ben hamida notes, “even where 
there is a legal basis for the admission of written briefs from disinterested third 
parties, it is not at all certain, in light of the traditions of each institution, 
their conception of arbitration, and their respective roles for arbitrators, that 
80 In the 2001 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua case, Judgment of August 31, 
2001, Inter-Am. Ct. h.R., (ser. C) no. 79 (2001), the Inter-American Court held that by granting a 
concession to a foreign investor, nicaragua had violated the property rights of the Mayagna Community 
because rights in the communal property of indigenous peoples are protected under the Inter-American 
Convention on human Rights. Likewise, the Inter-American Commission on human Rights in the 
2000 Mary & Carrie Dann case (no. 11.140), “made clear that a sui generis regime of international 
norms protecting indigenous rights in land now exists and should be applied within the context of any 
international dispute, as in the Inter-American system of human rights, even where the parties to that 
dispute were not parties to ILO Convention 169.”
81 See supra notes 29–49 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 50–67 and accompanying text.
icsid review Fall 2007 5-13-09.indd   305 5/14/09   2:49:01 PM
306 ICsID REvIEW—FOREIGn InvEsTMEnT LAW JOURnAL
the solution adopted in the Methanex and UPS cases would be systematically 
replicated under such regulations. An example of divergence is to be found in 
the Aguas Del Tunari S.A. v. republic of Bolivia case, which was submitted to 
ICsID on the basis of a 1992 netherlands-Bolivia BIT.”83
At the conclusion of his article on amici curiae in the nAFTA cases, Patrick 
Dumberry showed the same skepticism with regard to extending the solution 
adopted in the nAFTA cases:
[I]t is uncertain whether arbitral tribunals established pursuant to the 
ICSID Convention or under the Additional Facility rules (AFR) will 
interpret their power and discretion in the same fashion as the Tribunal 
in the Methanex Case …. [I]t is feasible to assume that the Tribunal in 
the Methanex Case would probably not have taken the decision to allow 
amicus briefs without the support from both the state of the investor 
(Canada) and the state receiving the investment (the United states). 
This award is closely linked with the special circumstances actually 
prevailing in the nAFTA context and its result will therefore probably 
not be easily transportable to other types of investment disputes.84
By contrast, in an article on the first two nAFTA cases published in 2002, 
I pointed out that the above-mentioned trend had doubtless not yet come to 
an end:
[T]he mechanism of adjudicating WTO cases largely opened the door 
to private entities, by authorizing the filing of amicus curiae briefs in 
commercial litigation between states. The favorable position toward 
civil society adopted through these means is in any event unlikely to 
remain so limited. The Tribunal in a recent arbitral case, Methanex 
Corporation v. United States,85 accepted amicus briefs partly on the basis 
of the existing WTO practice, and a second, confirmatory step was 
83 W. Ben hamida, Thesis, “L’arbitrage transnational unilatéral—Réflexions sur une procédure 
réservée à l’initiative d’une personne privée contre une personne publique,” Université Panthéon-Assas 
(Paris II) (Ph. Fouchard, directeur, June 2003), para. 826 (hereinafter Ben hamida). Indeed, the passage 
quoted was written before orders accepting amicus briefs were adopted in the ICsID context. See also E. 
Teynier, “Investissements internationaux et arbitrage,” in I. Fadlallah, Ch. Leben and E. Teynier (eds.), 
Cahiers de l’arbitrage 2, para. 4 (A. Mourre, series manager, 2005), where Eric Teynier wonders whether 
we should see in the increasingly frequent admittance of amicus curiae submissions the emergence of a 
rule of international law. In his view, it was not easy to give a definitive response to this suggestion at that 
stage (hereinafter Teynier).
84 Dumberry, supra note 28, at 213–214.
85 See supra notes 29–49 and accompanying text.
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taken in this direction in the arbitral case of UPS (United Parcel Service 
of America Inc.) v. Government of Canada.86 These cases appear to lay 
down the foundation for a new customary approach.87
Two other authors have underscored the point that developments initiated 
across the Atlantic under nAFTA Chapter 11 have undoubtedly been important, 
as they have acted as a kind of catalyst in a context where the lack of transparency 
in international arbitration is being questioned.88 It thus appears that the trend 
will continue in investment arbitration in general, in the same direction as that 
adopted in the investment arbitration cases under nAFTA Chapter 11, as will 
be seen in the next section, which deals with amicus curiae briefs in ICsID’s 
case law.
III. ThE EvOLUTIOn OF ThE APPROACh TO AMICUS CUrIAe 
BRIEFs In ThE ICsID COnTExT
The trend in favor of admitting amicus curiae briefs initiated under the 
WTO and continued under nAFTA has indeed been confirmed by the 
evolution of ICsID’s case law revealed in the order issued by the ICsID 
Arbitral Tribunal on May 19, 2005 in the Aguas Argentinas et al. v. The 
Argentine republic case (hereinafter referred to as Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 
1)89 and the very similar and even further-reaching one by an ICsID Tribunal 
composed of the same arbitrators in Aguas de Santa Fe et al. v. The Argentine 
republic (hereinafter referred to as Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas),90 issued 
86 See supra notes 50–67 and accompanying text.
87 stern, supra note 28, at 331.
88 Grisel and vinuales, supra note 4, at 15. The authors use the term “détonateur.”
89 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A, and Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. The Argentine republic, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as 
Amicus Curiae, ICsID Case no. ARB/03/19 (May 19, 2005). (This case is hereinafter referred to as Aguas 
Argentinas/Vivendi 1.) See G. Flores, “Introductory note to Aguas Argentinas, Order of May 19, 2005,” 
ICsID Rev. 339 (2006). In light of an April 14, 2006 Order terminating the Aguas Argentinas proceeding, 
the case was henceforth entitled Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. The Argentine republic. This explains the double reference employed in the short-form title “Aguas 
Argentina/Vivendi,” and renders the case’s presentation consistent across time. It may be noted for the 
record that a Decision on Jurisdiction was rendered on August 3, 2006 in this case.
90 Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas 
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine republic, Order in Response to a Petition for Participation 
as Amicus Curiae, ICsID Case no. ARB/03/17 (March 17, 2006). On April 14, 2006, an Order having 
terminated the Aguas de Santa Fe proceeding, the case was henceforth entitled Suez, Sociedad General 
de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine republic, 
which explains the double reference employed in the short-form title “Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas,” and 
renders the case’s presentation consistent across time. It may be noted for the record that a Decision on 
Jurisdiction was rendered on May 16, 2006 in this case.
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on March 17, 2006.91 These two cases followed the same path taken in the 
nAFTA cases for accepting amicus curiae briefs, even though an intervening 
ICsID case (Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, hereinafter referred to as Aguas del 
Tunari),92 may have seemed to point in another direction. In any event, the 
opening up of ICsID Tribunals to amicus curiae briefs was included in the 
new ICsID Regulations and Rules of April 2006, which were first applied in 
the Biwater Gauff case.93 Later developments, as demonstrated particularly by 
the second order made in the Aguas Argentinas et al. v. The Argentine republic 
case (hereinafter referred to as Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 2), have confirmed 
this new state of affairs.94
A. A Decision Unfavorable to Amicus Curiae Briefs Going Against the General 
Trend
In the Aguas del Tunari case, which concerned water distribution and 
sewage treatment in the town of Cochabamba in Bolivia under a concession 
contract granted to the Aguas del Tunari company, a number of environmental 
nGOs95 and natural persons filed a petition on August 28, 2002 before the 
Tribunal requesting permission to intervene in the arbitration.96 In fact, these 
nGOs and individuals, through their legal counsel, Earthjustice, demanded 
as a matter of priority a right to intervene as parties, and only secondarily, in 
the event this first request was refused, a right to intervene as amici curiae. The 
request to intervene as amici curiae was particularly broad, as it had been in 
91 See my article, B. stern, “Un petit pas de plus : l’installation de la société civile dans l’arbitrage 
CIRDI entre Etat et investisseur,” Rev. de l’arb. 3 (2007), and also the commentary of E. Teynier on 
amicus curiae in ICsID arbitration, in Teynier, supra note 83; see also Kinnear, supra note 32.
92 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. republic of Bolivia, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, 
ICsID Case no. ARB/02/3 (October 21, 2005) (hereinafter Aguas del Tunari). This case was stricken 
from the ICsID list upon the petition of the Parties, by an Order taking note of the discontinuance 
pursuant to ICsID Arbitration Rule 44, dated March 28, 2006.
93 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. republic of Tanzania, Procedural Order no. 5 (Amicus Curiae), 
ICsID Case no. ARB/05/22 (February 2, 2007); id., Procedural Order no. 6 (Amicus and post-hearing 
process) (May 7, 2007) (hereinafter Biwater).
94 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine 
republic, Order in Response to a Petition by Five non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to 
Make an Amicus Curiae submission, ICsID Case no. ARB/03/19 (February 12, 2007). (This case is 
hereinafter referred to as Aguas Argentina/Vivendi 2.) For things to be perfectly clear, Aguas Argentina/
Vivendi 1 refers to the first order on amicus curiae in this case, (i.e. the Order of May 19, 2005), and Aguas 
Argentina/Vivendi 2 to the second order (i.e. the Order of February 12, 2007).
95 These organizations and individuals were La Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y vida, La 
Federación Departamental Cochabambina de Organizaciones Regantes, sEMAPA sur, Friends of the 
Earth-netherlands, Oscar Olivera, Father Luis sánchez and Member of Congress Jorge Alvarado.
96 nGO Petition to Participate as Amici Curiae (August 29, 2002), at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
alphabetical_list_content.htm
icsid review Fall 2007 5-13-09.indd   308 5/14/09   2:49:01 PM
CIvIL sOCIETY’s vOICE In InTERnATIOnAL ECOnOMIC DIsPUTEs 309 
the nAFTA cases, since it involved the right to make written submissions, the 
right to attend hearings and to make oral submissions at hearings, and the right 
to immediate access to all of the documents related to the arbitration. But the 
desire for transparency expressed by the would-be amici went further and also 
concerned the public in general. The Tribunal was indeed asked to make public 
all documents related to the arbitration, to open its hearings to the public, and 
to go to the site at issue to see for itself the true situation in Cochabamba.
The usual arguments were advanced in the application for leave to intervene. 
The applicants first reminded the Tribunal of the context in which the concession 
granted to the Dutch company had ended:
Within weeks of taking control of the water system, the company raised 
water rates by an average of over 50% and in some cases far higher. 
Unable to pay their water bills, the people of Cochabamba participated 
in widespread public protests that caused the Government of Bolivia 
to declare a state of emergency, suspend constitutional rights, and 
ultimately to use violence to repress the protests, injuring more than 
100 people and killing a 17 year-old boy. When these measures failed 
to halt the protests, Aguas del Tunari abandoned its management of the 
water system and left the country. Aguas del Tunari has now brought a 
claim to this Tribunal demanding compensation for anticipated profits 
lost as a result of its departure.97
The existence of “issues of broad public interest” was the main justification 
for the application for leave to intervene.98 According to the petitioners, their 
intervention would ensure greater transparency and would guarantee a more 
democratic process:
Each Petitioner also has an interest in addressing the lack of transparency 
that traditionally attends international arbitral processes and in ensuring 
that issues with broad public impacts are resolved through democratic 
processes that provide for meaningful public participation.99
It should be noted that the rather rapid and undiscussed assimilation of a 
more transparent process to a democratic process would doubtless merit wider 
discussion, and the notion that ICsID is “a Bank-controlled institution”100 
97 Id. at para. 1.
98 Id. at para. 2.
99 Id.
100 Id. at para. 23.
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can likewise be disputed, because ICsID tribunals are indeed composed of 
independent arbitrators.
It bears noting that the application also pointed to an alleged wide and 
representative support:
support for this Petition is widespread. Over 300 representatives of civil 
society in Bolivia (the locus of the dispute), the netherlands (whose 
investment agreement with Bolivia Aguas del Tunari cites as a basis 
for bringing its claim before this Tribunal), the United states (where 
Bechtel Corporation, Aguas del Tunari’s parent company is based), and 
38 other countries have written to the Tribunal to express their concerns 
and urge the Tribunal to allow Petitioners to intervene.101
This was not the first time that the rather confidential nature of ICsID 
mechanisms was criticized. According to the petitioners, “[e]ven before this 
dispute arose, the ICsID system had developed a public reputation as being 
a ‘secret trade court’ in which urgent public matters are decided behind a 
shroud of secrecy, without any of the opportunities for public vigilance and 
participation.”102 It was this public participation that was demanded so that 
the Tribunal could be fully informed of the opinions of those who would be 
directly affected by the award, rather than simply of the opinions of the foreign 
company and the Bolivian Government. According to the petitioners, only such 
participation could guarantee the public acceptance of the arbitral proceedings 
in this case, as well as in other cases:
As noted above, there is strong and wide-spread public skepticism 
concerning the legitimacy of this Tribunal’s resolution of Aguas del 
Tunari’s claim, based in large part on the secrecy of the Tribunal’s 
proceedings and their potentially broad impacts. If not addressed, that 
skepticism could weaken public acceptance of this Tribunal’s award, as 
well as the operations of other arbitral tribunals.103
The Tribunal summarily rejected all of the petitioners’ demands in a letter 
dated January 23, 2003 from the President of the Tribunal, who pointed 
out that the Tribunal had examined very seriously and in detail the request 
submitted:
101 Id. at para. 4.
102 Id. at para. 30.
103 Id. at para. 61.
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The Tribunal wishes to emphasize that it has given serious consideration 
to your request. The briefness of our reply should not be taken as 
an indication that your request was viewed in other than a serious 
manner.104
Extracts from this letter were incorporated into the Decision of the Tribunal 
on Objections to Jurisdiction, of October 21, 2005:
The Tribunal’s unanimous opinion is that your core requests are beyond 
the power of the authority of the Tribunal to grant. The interplay of the 
two treaties involved (the Convention on the settlement of Investment 
Disputes and the 1992 Bilateral Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the 
netherlands and Bolivia) and the consensual nature of arbitration places 
the control of the issues you raise with the parties, not the Tribunal. In 
particular, it is manifestly clear to the Tribunal that it does not, absent 
the agreement of the Parties, have the power to join a non-party to the 
proceedings; to provide access to hearings to non-parties and a fortiori, 
to the public generally; or to make the documents of the proceedings 
public.105
While the consensual nature of the arbitration was highlighted as the 
reason why the Tribunal believed acceptance of the request would be ultra 
vires, the Tribunal left open the possibility of its appealing to witnesses sua 
sponte, stating that its position was “without in any way prejudging the 
question of the extent of the Tribunal’s authority to call witnesses or to 
receive information from non-parties on its own initiative.”106 At the same 
time, the Tribunal believed that such an approach was not necessary at the 
jurisdictional phase.
B. Two Decisions Favorable to Amicus Curiae Briefs Following the General Trend
Two ICsID cases adopting a different approach concern precisely the same 
type of public services as in the Aguas del Tunari case, and the inconsistent 
reasonings behind these decisions is quite interesting. In the first case, Aguas 
104 Letter from President of Tribunal Responding to Petition (January 29, 2003), at http://ita.law.
uvic.ca/alphabetical_list_content.htm
105 Aguas del Tunari, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, supra note 92, at para. 
17.
106 Id. at para. 18.
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Argentinas/Vivendi 1, five nGOs107 wanted to intervene because they believed 
that important issues of general interest to the public concerning water 
distribution and sewage treatment in the Buenos Aires region were at stake. In 
the second case, Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, the same type of services—water 
distribution and sewage treatment in the santa Fe region—were also at stake 
and gave rise to the intervention of one nGO108 and three natural persons.109
The first comment to be made about these cases is that the orders concerning 
amici curiae do not mention the negative position adopted by the ICsID 
Tribunal in the Aguas del Tunari case. This is easily explained with respect to 
the first order because even though the letter of the President of the Aguas del 
Tunari Tribunal was dated January 29, 2003, an official and public reference 
to it was made by that Tribunal only in the decision of October 21, 2005, that 
is, after the Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1 order. silence is less easily explained 
in the Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas order of 2006, in which the Tribunal—
without any reference expressis verbis to the Aguas del Tunari case—noted that 
“to the knowledge of the Tribunal, no previous tribunal functioning under 
ICsID Rules has granted a nonparty to a dispute the status of amicus curiae 
and accepted amicus curiae submissions,”110 before the May 19, 2005 decision 
in Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1. In other words, the Tribunal also ignored the 
Aguas del Tunari decision, and indicated that it “believes that the issues raised 
by the present Petition in this case are virtually identical to those raised in the 
petition filed by the five nongovernmental organizations and decided in the 
Tribunal’s order of May 19, 2005. The Tribunal has therefore decided to apply 
the principles of that decision to the present petition.”111
In the two cases, the would-be amici curiae presented three different 
requests—access to hearings, the right to submit written amicus curiae briefs, and 
access to all documents related to the arbitration—over which the two parties 
expressed diametrically opposed views. In the second case, the request for access 
to hearings also included an application for leave to make oral submissions. 
The Claimants in the two cases wanted the Tribunals to reject the requests 
totally, while the defendant state advocated that the Tribunals admit them. The 
107 These nGOs were the Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ), Centro de Estudios 
Legales y sociales (CELs), Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Consumidores 
Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de servicios de Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de Usuarios y 
Consumidores.
108 This nGO was la Fundación para el Desarrollo sustentable.
109 These natural persons were Professor Ricardo Ignacio Beltramino, Dr. Ana María herren and Dr. 
Omar Darío heffes.
110 Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 90, at para. 9.
111 Id. at para. 4.
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Tribunals successively examined the three different requests of the petitioners, 
rejecting the first, half-opening the door to the second, and deferring their 
decision on the third.
1. refusing Access to Hearings of the Tribunal
The Arbitral Tribunals in the two cases made their decision on access to 
hearings quite rapidly. The Tribunals referred to the arbitration rule contained 
in the version of Article 32 of the ICsID Arbitration Rules which was then 
applicable to the facts of the case, and which was cited in the orders:
The Tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the parties, which 
other persons besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, 
witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the 
Tribunal may attend the hearings.
The Arbitral Tribunals have considered this rule to be perfectly clear:
Rule 32 (2) is clear that no other persons, except those specifically 
named in the Rule, may attend hearings unless both Claimant and 
respondent affirmatively agree to the attendance of those persons 
... Although the Tribunal, as the Petition asserts, does have certain 
inherent powers with respect to arbitral procedure, it has no 
authority to exercise such power in opposition to a clear directive in 
the Arbitration Rule, which both Claimants and Respondent have 
agreed will govern the procedure in this case.112
The Tribunals therefore decided unanimously, and without any hesitation, 
to refuse access to hearings by the petitioners.
2. Limited and Conditional Acceptance of Amicus Curiae Briefs
The Tribunals in Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1 and Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas 
adopted an innovative solution within the ICsID context—despite its being in 
line with a clearly perceptible general trend in the arbitration field—but also 
took care to be extremely meticulous. They began by offering a definition of 
the role that, according to them, ought to be played by an “amicus curiae” 
intervention:
112 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 6; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 7 (emphasis added in 
both).
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In such cases, a nonparty to the dispute, as “a friend,” offers to provide 
the court or tribunal its special perspectives, arguments, or expertise 
on the dispute, usually in the form of a written amicus curiae brief or 
submission.113
Once the role of the amicus curiae has been clearly defined, the Tribunals 
have examined what are the possible jurisdictional grounds that may enable 
them to authorize a submission of amicus curiae briefs and, on the assumption 
that they have such jurisdiction, the conditions under which it may properly 
be exercised. According to the actual words of the Tribunals, two questions 
arise:
1) Does the Tribunal have the power to accept and consider amicus 
curiae submissions by nonparties to the case? And 2) If it has that power, 
what are the conditions under which it should exercise it?114
a. Assertion of a Limited Procedural Power
The Tribunals’ examination of the jurisdictional grounds for accepting 
amicus curiae briefs started with their finding that the admittance of amicus 
curiae briefs is neither explicitly authorized nor explicitly forbidden by the 
Washington Convention or the ICsID Arbitration Rules.115 It was therefore 
deemed proper to do a further analysis by interpreting certain general provisions 
in order to determine whether the Tribunals possessed an inherent power to 
authorize the submission of amicus curiae briefs. It was in Article 44 of the 
ICsID Convention that the Tribunals found what they called a “residual power 
… to decide procedural questions.”116
Evidently, there was open discussion about whether an amicus curiae 
intervention is a question of procedure or of substance. This discussion had already 
raged in the WTO, and therefore the Tribunals proceeded step by step, taking the 
reader by the hand, proceeding first to a definition of what constitutes a question 
of procedure, then identifying the characteristics of an amicus curiae brief:
At a basic level of interpretation, a procedural question is one which 
relates to the manner of proceeding or which deals with the way to 
accomplish a stated end. …
113 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 8; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 9.
114 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 9; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 10.
115 “neither the ICsID Convention nor the Arbitration Rules specifically authorize or prohibit the 
submission by nonparties of amicus curiae briefs or other documents.” Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 
9; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 10.
116 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 10; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 11.
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The admission of an amicus curiae submission would fall within 
this definition of procedural question since it can be viewed as a step 
in assisting the Tribunal to achieve its fundamental task of arriving at a 
correct decision in this case.117
The Tribunals therefore rejected the analysis submitted by the petitioners,118 
according to whom it was a question of substance insofar as everything, in the 
event of an amicus curiae intervention, takes place as if a new party had been 
introduced into the proceedings. The Tribunals insisted on the contrary that 
“[a]n amicus curiae is, as the Latin words indicate, a ‘friend of the court,’ and 
is not a party to the proceeding.”119 The Tribunals were firm on this point in a 
paragraph devoted entirely to this specific issue:
The traditional role of an amicus curiae in an adversary proceeding is to 
help the decision maker arrive at its decision by providing the decision 
maker with arguments, perspectives, and expertise that the litigating parties 
may not provide. In short, a request to act as amicus curiae is an offer of 
assistance—an offer that the decision maker is free to accept or reject. An 
amicus curiae is a volunteer, a friend of the court, not a party.120
It bears noting that the Tribunals quoted nAFTA precedents at each stage of 
their reasoning. Thus, the Tribunals justified their interpretation of Article 44 of 
the ICsID Convention by comparing it to the analysis made by the Tribunal in 
Methanex.121 Likewise, the Tribunals invoked the Methanex case to justify defining 
the issue of an amicus curiae brief ’s submission as a procedural one. But not only did 
the Tribunals refer to nAFTA cases, they also referred to other forums’ precedents: 
“The Tribunal in the present case finds further support for the admission of amicus 
submissions in international arbitral proceedings in the practices of nAFTA, the 
Iran-United states Claims Tribunal[122] and the World Trade Organization.”123
117 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 11; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 12.
118 This was expressly elaborated upon only by the claimants in Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1.
119 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 13; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 13.
120 Id.
121 For a critique of this comparison between the ICsID rule and the UnCITRAL rule, see Kessedjian, 
“L’amicus curiae,” supra note 5, at 13.
122 This is done indirectly through a reference to the decision in Methanex, where the tribunal referred 
to the fifth footnote added by the Iran-United states Claims Tribunal to the UnCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, in order to explain its own understanding and application of Article 15(1) of the UnCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, which was accepted to govern the procedure of the Iran-United states Claims Tribunal, 
and which reads: “The arbitral tribunal, having satisfied itself that the statement of one of the two 
Governments—or, under special circumstances, any other person—who is not an arbitrating party in a 
particular case is likely to assist the arbitral tribunal in carrying out its task, may permit such Government 
or person to assist the arbitral tribunal by presenting written and [or] oral statements.” Methanex “Amici 
Curiae” Decision, supra note 29, at para. 32.
123 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 15; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 15. (Internal citations 
omitted.)
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The Tribunals therefore concluded that they had the power under Article 
44 of the ICsID Convention to admit amicus curiae briefs. They also indicated, 
however, that they could exercise that power only under certain conditions. It 
is indeed worthwhile to analyze carefully the Tribunals’ assertion of the extent 
of their power, for they did not recognize that they had an absolute power, but 
rather a strictly circumscribed one:
The Tribunal [unanimously] concludes that Article 44 of the ICsID 
Convention grants it the power to admit amicus curiae submissions 
from suitable nonparties in appropriate cases.124
Two conditions underlying the power that the Tribunals asserted are hereby 
expressed. One condition has to do with the “friend of the court,” and the other 
with the nature of the case. The friend must be “suitable” or “appropriate.”125 
The case must also itself be “appropriate.” To these two conditions—more or less 
inherent in the Tribunals’ power—was added a third, more extrinsic procedural 
condition. Three cumulative conditions must thus be considered:
(a) the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case; (b) the suitability 
of a given nonparty to act as amicus curiae in that case, and (c) the 
procedure by which the amicus submission is made and considered.126
According to the Tribunals, it is only if these three conditions are met 
that they will have performed their role fully, while still respecting the specific 
interests of the disputants and also the more general interests of persons deemed 
affected by the proceedings in question:
The Tribunal believes that the judicious application of these criteria will 
enable it to balance the interests of concerned nondisputant parties to be 
heard and at the same time protect the substantive and procedural rights 
of the disputants to a fair, orderly, and expeditious arbitral process.127
124 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 16; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 16. Oddly enough, the 
word “unanimously” does not appear in paragraph 16 of the Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas decision, but 
this was probably an oversight.
125 This is repeated several times: “suitable nonparties” (Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 20; Aguas 
de Santa Fe/ InterAguas, para. 19); “appropriate nonparties” (Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 21; Aguas 
de Santa Fe/ InterAguas, para. 20); and “appropriate representatives of civil society in appropriate cases” 
(Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi, para. 22; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas; para. 21).
126 Aguas de Argentina/Vivendi 1, para. 17; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 17.
127 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 17; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 17 (emphasis added in 
both). Along the same lines, the Tribunals’ insistence on maintaining a balance between opposing interests 
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b. Conditions for exercising This Limited Procedural Power
During their evaluation of the respective interests at stake, the Tribunals 
conducted a review to determine whether characteristic criteria were present 
that would justify an amicus curiae intervention. They did this by first 
determining whether there was a genuine public interest in the case, that is, 
by verifying “[t]he appropriateness of the subject matter of the case for amicus 
curiae submissions.”128
As in the other discussed cases where amici curiae have sought to intervene, 
the nGOs and private persons seeking to intervene cited significant public 
interests as justification for their intervention. The Tribunals first adopted a 
very general approach to the notion of a public interest, stating that a case 
raises issues of public interest when it has “the potential, directly or indirectly, 
to affect persons beyond those immediately involved as parties in the case.”129 
however, in light of the theory that the movement of a butterfly’s wing at one 
end of the world can have an impact on the other end, a case’s ability to have 
some potential direct or indirect effect on third-parties cannot be a sufficient 
condition for an amicus curiae intervention. The Tribunals therefore sought to 
provide a more precise definition of the notion of a general public interest.
 In my view, the Tribunals adopted a relatively restrictive notion of public 
interest so that any challenge to the legality of an act of a state under international 
law does not appear to pose sufficient grounds in itself for a public interest to 
arise and create the possibility of an amicus curiae intervention. The act of the 
state in question must also have an object and purpose that involves broader 
interests than those raised in the dispute submitted for arbitration. For example, 
the act must pertain to public services.
After conducting a review of the facts of the cases, the Tribunals determined 
that such an interest existed in the cases under discussion. The Tribunals first 
noted that the international responsibility of Argentina was at stake, but seemed 
to indicate that this was not a sufficient condition in itself for an amicus curiae 
intervention. Indeed, were this the interpretation to be given to the reasoning of 
the Tribunals, the restrictive condition regarding the nature of the cases would 
cease to exist since, as indicated by the Tribunals, all ICsID matters could then 
be claimed to be of public interest:
bears noting: “Rather than to reject offers of such assistance peremptorily, the Tribunal, while taking care 
to preserve the procedural and substantive rights of the disputing parties and the orderly and efficient 
conduct of the arbitration, believes it is appropriate to consider carefully whether to accept or reject such 
offers.” Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 21; Aguas de Santa Fe/ InterAguas, para. 20.
128 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 19; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 18.
129 Id.
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This case will consider the legality under international law, not domestic 
private law, of various actions and measures taken by governments. The 
international responsibility of a state, the Argentine Republic, is also at 
stake, as opposed to the liability of a corporation arising out of private 
law. While these factors are certainly matters of public interest, they 
are present in virtually all cases of investment treaty arbitration under 
ICsID jurisdiction.130
It appears that the Tribunals were of the view that there must be a more 
specific public interest, and in fact, the Tribunals clearly cited what they 
referred to as a “particular public interest,” meaning that a very large number 
of persons were affected by the basic public service in question—water 
distribution and sewage treatment—and that this could even raise human 
rights considerations:
The factor that gives this case particular public interest is that the 
investment dispute centers around the water distribution and sewage 
systems of a large metropolitan area, the city of Buenos Aires and 
surrounding municipalities [of urban areas in the province of santa Fe]. 
Those systems provide basic public services to millions of people and 
as a result may raise a variety of complex public and international law 
questions, including human rights considerations.131
I cannot share the view expressed in Eric Teynier’s analysis on this point, 
which found that the Tribunals had acknowledged that any dispute brought 
before an ICsID tribunal under a BIT involved a public interest, and had 
thereby paved the way for the submission of amicus curiae briefs in all cases. 
he further found that the Tribunals had recognized that the ICsID arbitration 
avenue established in the relevant investment treaties was essential to the public 
interest because what was at stake in these cases was the consideration under 
international law of the legality of measures taken by states vis-à-vis investors, 
and thus their international responsibility.132
Admittedly, while an evaluation of state responsibility was undoubtedly 
one of the factors contributing to the Tribunals’ decisions, it did not appear, 
in my view, to be a sufficiently good reason for their judgment. In the same 
vein, two authors commenting on the Methanex case underscored this point, 
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Teynier, supra note 83, at 21, para. 8.
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noting that the Tribunal in that case had linked the existence of this public-
interest consideration to the substantive nature of that arbitration, and not to 
the “public” status of either of the two parties. In other words, they found that 
the public interest in that arbitration stemmed from its substantive content,133 
as did, in my view, the Tribunals in the two cases under discussion.
Once the substantive requirements of the law were established, the Tribunals 
had to determine whether they were met in the cases at hand. In order to make 
this determination, the Tribunals introduced the two-stage procedure that has 
been well known since its adoption by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism: 
first, the application for leave to intervene, and then, if the application has been 
approved, the actual intervention. The Tribunals at that point in time examined 
only the first stage of the proceedings.134
During the first step of the first stage, a friend of the court must submit an 
application to the Tribunal for leave to intervene in said court:
In order for the Tribunal to make that determination, each nonparty 
wishing to submit an amicus curiae brief must first apply to the Tribunal 
for leave to make an amicus submission.135
This was the opportunity for the Tribunals to indicate what they regarded 
as the ideal profile of a friend of the court. The Tribunals indicated that a truly 
effective friend is one who has the “expertise, experience and independence”136 to 
be of assistance in the case in question. In order to establish to their satisfaction the 
existence of these various qualities, the Tribunals, by referring to the experience 
gained under the WTO and nAFTA, requested that potential friends of the 
court provide certain information to enable the Tribunals to determine with 
whom they were dealing. The requested information should reveal any links 
between the friend of the court and the parties in the dispute, and should state 
whether an individual friend of the court belongs to a relevant organization, 
the nature of this person’s relationship with said organization, and any evidence 
pointing to a possible financial relationship between the friend of the court and 
the parties. More specifically, the Tribunals attached great importance to four 
types of information described in their decisions:
133 Grisel and vinuales, supra note 4, at 41.
134 It was only in Aguas Argentina Vivendi 2 that the second stage was dealt with.
135 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 24; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 23.
136 “The Tribunal will therefore only accept amicus submissions from persons who establish to the 
Tribunal’s satisfaction that they have the expertise, experience, and independence to be of assistance in this 
case.” Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 24; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 23.
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a. The identity and background of the petitioner, the nature of its 
membership if it is an organization, and the nature of its relationships, 
if any, to the parties in the dispute.
b. The nature of the petitioner’s interest in the case.
c.  Whether the petitioner has received financial or other material 
support from any of the parties or from any person connected with 
the parties in this case.
d. The reasons why the Tribunal should accept petitioner’s amicus curiae 
brief.137
After the submission of a petition, the second phase of this first stage involved 
the Tribunals’ consultation with the parties to ascertain their opinions on the 
amicus curiae intervention. Then it was time for the Tribunals to render their 
decision. here again, the Tribunals demonstrated transparency by listing the 
various factors that in their view must be taken into account when authorizing 
or rejecting an intervention. In addition to the information included in the 
petition from the would-be friend of the court, and the views of the parties, 
the Tribunals indicated that weight would be given to the burden created for 
the parties by the amicus curiae briefs submitted, as well as the usefulness of the 
latter to the Tribunals’ decision. such an approach was indeed extremely sound 
and balanced.
3. The Actual exercise of Amicus Curiae Acceptance Power in the Two Cases
a. The rejection of Amicus Curiae Interventions at the Jurisdictional 
Stage in the Two Cases
On the basis of the aforementioned criteria, the Tribunals opined that the 
parties had sufficiently discussed the issues of jurisdiction raised in the two 
cases, so that an intervention by friends of the court would not effectively assist 
the Tribunals in making a decision regarding their jurisdiction. This should not 
be viewed as a general statement declaring that amicus curiae briefs will always 
be deemed ineffective at the jurisdictional stage, but only as an evaluation 
by the Tribunals that this was so in the two cases submitted to them.138 The 
logical conclusion to be drawn is that the Tribunals did not deem it necessary 
or appropriate to state the procedure that should be followed during the second 
phase, when an amicus curiae brief is actually accepted. But there was little risk 
137 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 25; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 24.
138 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 28; Aguas de Santa Fe/ InterAguas, para. 27.
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in predicting that, as was the case during the initial stage of the procedure, the 
procedure regarding the submission of an amicus curiae brief may very well be 
modeled on those used first under the WTO, and then under nAFTA.
It should also be noted that in these first two orders, the Tribunals underscored 
the fact that although the proposed intervention was rejected, “[n]othing in this 
order … should be read as implying any determination on jurisdiction.”139
A last remark that may be made concerns the way in which the procedure 
was handled during the jurisdictional phase. It appears from a mention in the 
two decisions on jurisdiction that the Respondent, in spite of the orders denying 
access to amici curiae at the jurisdictional stage, tried to “present unsolicited 
documents,”140 during the proceedings on jurisdiction. Both Tribunals requested 
the parties to refrain from making such unsolicited submissions.
b. An evaluation of the Criteria Allowing for Amicus Curiae Status 
which, when Applied, Led to Different rulings in the Two Cases at the 
Merits Stage
In the Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas case, the Tribunal had already addressed 
the question of the suitability of the would-be amici curiae for participation in 
the merits stage, in its initial Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as 
Amicus Curiae. In the Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi case, this issue was examined in 
a second order, the Order in Response to a Petition by Five non-Governmental 
Organizations for Permission to Make an Amicus Curiae submission, which 
was an answer to a new application for leave to submit amicus curiae briefs 
entered by five nGOs for the merits stage.
In the Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas case, the Tribunal proceeded first to 
examine whether the petitioners qualified as appropriate amici curiae in the case. 
In order to respond to this question, the Tribunal examined in succession the 
information submitted to it, using as its yardstick the four required criteria noted 
above. After doing this, the Tribunal considered itself to be still insufficiently 
informed on these points to render a reasoned decision based on law.
With regard to “the identity and background of the petitioners,” the 
Tribunal opined that the information provided lacked sufficient details, and 
consequently did not allow the Tribunal to ascertain whether the would-be 
friends of the court truly possessed the necessary qualifications:
however the Petition provides no information on the nature and size 
of its membership, the qualifications of its leadership, the expertise of 
139 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 32; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 31.
140 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 15; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 15.
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its staff, and the activities in which it has engaged. In short, it fails 
to provide the Tribunal with specific information to judge whether 
the Fundación para el Desarrollo Sustentable possesses the expertise 
and experience to qualify as an appropriate amicus curiae in this case. 
similarly, the Petition only briefly and summarily identifies and gives 
the background of the three individual petitioners. Without detailed 
curricula vitae of the three named individuals, the Tribunal is unable 
to judge whether they possess the expertise and experience to serve as 
amici curiae in the present case.141
In other words, the Tribunal must have information adequate to enable it to 
determine whether those wishing to intervene do in fact possess two of the three 
basic qualities required, namely expertise and experience, which help to ensure 
the effectiveness of such an intervention. non-governmental organizations must 
provide information on the nature and size of their membership, the qualifications 
of their leadership, and specific details on the activities in which they engage. 
Individual petitioners must provide curricula vitae that are sufficiently detailed 
to enable the Tribunal to determine their suitability. In Aguas de Santa Fe/
InterAguas, the Tribunal ruled that the information provided by the nGO and 
the individual petitioners was inadequate, and thus did not allow the Tribunal 
to determine whether they truly possessed the necessary qualifications.
With regard to “the interests of the petitioner in the case,” the decision 
indicated that a would-be friend of the court must provide evidence of a 
relatively specific interest and cannot merely cite a general interest in sustainable 
development, the environment or human rights. According to the Tribunal, “[t]he 
Petitioners state their interest in this case in the most general of terms …. [I]t is 
impossible for the Tribunal to infer such interest with any degree of specificity 
from the Petition as a whole.”142 This was perhaps an indication of a desire not 
to grant all nGOs and all activists access to the arbitral process, but to limit 
interventions to those nGOs or individuals that are specifically interested in the 
legal issues at stake. It appears that the Tribunal also wanted to communicate 
the fact that it would not presume the existence of such an interest based solely 
on the filing of an application for an amicus curiae intervention.
A third factor affecting qualification as a friend of the court is “the 
petitioners’ financial or other relationships with the parties.” Once again, the 
Tribunal did not believe it had sufficient information to be able to determine 
to its satisfaction that those who had submitted an application for intervention 
met the independence criterion:
141 Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 30.
142 Id. at para. 31.
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In order for the Tribunal to evaluate the independence of the Fundación, 
it would be necessary to have additional information on its membership. 
To judge the independence of the three individual petitioners it would 
be necessary to know the nature, if any, of their professional and financial 
relationships, with the Claimants or the Respondent.143
Lastly, the Tribunal asked the potential interveners to specify “the reasons 
why the Tribunal should accept the petitioners’ amicus curiae brief.” The 
Tribunal in making this demand made it clear that “[i]t is not enough for a 
nongovernmental organization to justify an amicus submission on general 
grounds that it represents civil society or that it is devoted to humanitarian 
concerns.”144 Given the lack of sufficiently specific information received in this 
regard, the Tribunal concluded that it could not at that stage determine that 
the potential interveners were qualified as friends of the court. The Tribunal 
nevertheless left the door open for another review if more specific information 
were submitted to it in support of a new application to intervene. As of the 
writing of this article, no new request or new information has been presented 
to the Tribunal.
In Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, like in Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, the 
Tribunal both accepted the principle of amicus curiae and did not consider 
it appropriate at the jurisdictional stage. It thereby showed that the door for 
interveners is quite narrow, and that those chosen to enter should be few in 
number. The Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 2 order, however, provided an opportunity 
for greater access. At the merits stage, after referring to its order in the Aguas 
Argentinas/Vivendi 1 case, in which the Tribunal had explained the conditions 
necessary for authorization to file an amicus curiae brief, the Tribunal turned 
its attention to new applications from the five aforementioned nGOs that had 
already filed an unsuccessful application to intervene at the jurisdictional stage. 
The first application was for approval to file a joint brief, while the second 
was “to be given timely, sufficient, and unrestricted access to the documents 
produced during the course of the arbitration in order to focus their amicus 
submission on the questions most pertinent to the case.”145
Before taking its decision, the Tribunal requested observations from both 
parties to the dispute. The Claimant asked the Tribunal to reject the request on the 
ground, among others, that Aguas Argentina was no longer the concessionnaire 
and that the question was now merely one of damages and no longer involved 
questions of public interest. The Respondent for its part had no objection to 
143 Id. at para. 32.
144 Id. at para. 33.
145 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 2, para. 7.
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the intervention. The Tribunal subsequently verified that the friends of the 
court were suitable and that the subject matter of the case was appropriate for 
intervention. The Tribunal considered that it now had “sufficient information 
to show that the five Petitioners are respected nongovernmental organizations 
and that they have as a group developed an expertise in and are experienced 
with matters of human rights, the environment, and the provision of public 
services.”146 The Tribunal also accepted that they were independent, and that 
“the Petitioners have demonstrated their suitability to make amicus submissions 
in this case.”147
The second matter to be considered was the appropriateness of the subject 
matter of the case for intervention. The Tribunal did not accept the idea that 
the withdrawal of Aguas Argentinas148 had fundamentally changed the nature of 
the subject matter of the case, which involved “basic public services to millions 
of people.”149 Although the Tribunal’s decision on the merits could not bind the 
new concessionnaire, the Tribunal found that such a decision in respect of this 
type of subject matter can have a kind of didactic importance:
More generally, because of the high stakes in this arbitration and the wide 
publicity of ICsID awards, one cannot rule out that the forthcoming 
decision may have some influence on how governments and foreign 
investor operators of the water industry approach concessions and 
interact when faced with difficulties.150
The Tribunal concluded on this basis that the case presented sufficient 
aspects of public interest to justify an amicus curiae submission.
Going forward, the Tribunal emphasized that amicus briefs need to be 
properly prepared. The Tribunal provided substantive guidelines as well as 
procedural directives in this regard. The Tribunal recalled that in its first order, it 
had stated that a friend of the court was there “to help the decision maker arrive 
at its decision by providing the decision maker with arguments, perspectives, 
and expertise that the litigating parties may not provide.”151 The Tribunal added 
that “[s]uch ‘arguments, perspectives and expertise’ may relate to law, facts, or 
the application of law to the facts.”152
146 Id. at para. 16.
147 Id.
148 See supra note 89.
149 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 2, para. 18.
150 Id.
151 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 13.
152 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 2, para. 20.
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The Tribunal limited the amicus briefs to 30 double-spaced pages (in font 
size 12), and gave the parties two months to make their observations on the 
amicus briefs.153
c. The Lack of a Decision in either Case on Access to All Documents 
related to the Case
In the Aguas Argentina/Vivendi 1 and Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas cases, 
the third request made by the would-be amici curiae concerned access to all 
documents related to the case. In Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, a further request 
was entered asking for leave to make oral submissions. The Tribunals linked 
the review of this issue to that of the submission of amicus curiae briefs. Taking 
the view that access to documents related to the proceedings is warranted only 
to allow friends of the court to better present their observations, and having 
not deemed it necessary in the first two orders in the cases to authorize the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs, the Tribunals determined that it would be 
premature to make a landmark ruling regarding access to documentation related 
to the proceedings. The Tribunals, however, pointed out that the issues raised 
by this type of application could not be easily resolved in the ICsID context:
This broad request for all documentation in the case raises difficult 
and delicate questions because of certain constraints in the ICsID 
Convention and Rules and in the practice of the Centre.154
The Tribunal in Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 2 was again presented at the 
merits phase with an opportunity to rule on the question of full access to the 
entire case file. The Tribunal opted not to take a position on this question, 
which it described as delicate, because it found the new version of the ICsID 
Arbitration Rules, while not applicable to the case, to be silent on this question. 
The Tribunal also took cover behind the specific facts of the case in order to 
rule that access to the documents was not necessary. The Tribunal did not take 
a position on the theoretical aspect of the question, however:
In the present case, the Petitioners have sufficient information even 
without being granted access to the arbitration record. hence, because 
of the specifics of these proceedings, the Tribunal can dispense with 
resolving the general question of a non-party’s access to the record.155
153 Id. at para. 27.
154 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 30; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 35.
155 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 2, para. 24.
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4. A Profession of Faith Favorable to Transparency in International Investor-
State Arbitration
After noting that there was a clear public interest justifying the taking into 
consideration of the perspectives and arguments of amici curiae, the Tribunals 
added that an intervention by friends of the court had a further desirable 
consequence, namely increased transparency in international investor-state 
arbitration that guaranteed a higher level of understanding and acceptance of 
such processes:
Public acceptance of the legitimacy of international arbitral processes, 
particularly when they involve states and matters of public interest, is 
strengthened by increased openness and increased knowledge as to how 
these processes function …. Through the participation of appropriate 
representatives of civil society in appropriate cases, the public will gain 
increased understanding of ICsID processes.156
This notion whereby “transparency” facilitates widespread acceptance of 
international arbitration is often advanced,157 and has been perfectly explained 
in the April 2005 OECD Working Paper on International Investment prepared 
by Katia Yannaca-small:
Investment arbitral awards may have a significant impact on the state’s 
future conduct, the national budget and the welfare of the people, so 
the public interest in investment disputes is understandable. Increased 
transparency can contribute to enhancing effectiveness and continued 
acceptance of the system of investment arbitration.158
In the subsequent statement of the OECD Investment Committee, which 
was adopted in June 2005, the Committee’s Member states adopted this same 
view, although they remained relatively cautious with regard to the wording 
used in their statement.
156 Aguas Argentinas/Vivendi 1, para. 22; Aguas de Santa Fe/InterAguas, para. 21.
157 For a critique of the secret nature of courts settling international economic disputes, see, e.g., an 
editorial in the new York Times entitled “The secret Trade Courts” (september 27, 2004).
158 OECD, “Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-state Dispute settlement 
Procedures,” Working Paper no. 2005/1 (June 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/3/34786913.
pdf, at 14, para. 41.
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C. The “routine” Use of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Biwater Gauff Case
It bears noting first of all that the order of February 2, 2007 regarding 
the Biwater Gauff case was the first to be premised on the new Article 37(2) 
of the amended ICsID Arbitration Rules.159 In this case, five entities filed an 
application for leave to participate in the written and oral phases of the arbitral 
process, and to gain access to the parties’ submissions.160 Interestingly, one of 
these would-be “friends of the court” was “a company limited by guarantee,” 
while the four others were nGOs, two of which—CIEL and IIsD—had 
already been granted amicus curiae status in Methanex and (in CIEL’s case) 
Aguas Argentina/Vivendi 2. A class of nGOs specializing in the formulation of 
amicus curiae briefs seems thus to be emerging. The interest of these petitioners 
was expressed in very general terms:
[T]his arbitration process goes far beyond merely resolving commercial 
or private conflicts, but rather has a substantial influence on the 
population’s ability to enjoy basic human rights …. how international 
investment agreements, which by and large share similar structures and 
substantive content, can be applied to govern foreign investments in 
major infrastructure projects is asserted to be of critical concern for the 
sustainable development of these countries.161
The Claimants objected to the petition and to the entities’ requests to have 
access to the key documents of the case, and to be allowed to access the hearing 
and answer any questions which the Tribunal might want to ask them. The 
Respondent’s position was the opposite:
Respondent submits that the Petitioners appear to be potentially 
appropriate amici in light of their organisational interests, their 
experience as amici and the experience and reputation of their counsel 
…. Respondent states that it would not object in principle to the 
Petitioners having access to the four categories of documents identified 
in the Petition …. The Republic submits that it would be willing to 
admit the Petitioners to the hearing.162
159 This is mentioned in the award: “since April 10, 2006, the amended ICsID Arbitration Rules 
have explicitly given tribunals the power to allow for submissions of non-disputing parties.” Biwater, supra 
note 93, Award at para. 17.
160 These entities were the Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), the Legal and human Rights 
Center (LhRC), the Tanzania Gender networking Programme (TGnP), the Center for International 
Environmental Law (CIEL), and the International Institute for sustainable Development (IIsD).
161 Biwater, supra note 93, Award at para. 14.
162 Id. at paras. 42–43, 45.
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Although it declared that “Rule 37(2) establishes the right of third parties 
to apply for amicus curiae status,”163 the Tribunal made it clear from the outset 
that an amicus curiae is not a party:
It might be noted at the outset that the ICsID Rules do not, in terms, 
provide for an amicus curiae “status”, in so far as this might be taken to 
denote a standing in the overall arbitration akin to that of a party, with 
the full range of procedural privileges that that might entail … a “non-
disputing party” does not become a party to the arbitration by virtue 
of a tribunal’s decision under Rule 37, but is instead afforded a specific 
and defined opportunity to make a particular submission.164
The Tribunal nevertheless granted the petitioners authorization to submit 
an amicus brief:
The Arbitral Tribunal has carefully considered each of the conditions in 
Rule 37(2) (a), (b) and (c). On the basis of the information provided 
in the Petition, the nature and expertise of each Petitioner, and the 
submissions summarised above, the Arbitral Tribunal is of the view that 
it may benefit from a written submission by the Petitioners, and that 
allowing for the making of such submission by these entities in these 
proceedings is an important element in the overall discharge of the 
Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate, and in securing wider confidence in the 
arbitral process itself.165
The usual concern that the submissions of the amici curiae not disturb the 
proceedings was mentioned by the parties, and as a consequence the Tribunal 
decided to limit the amicus brief to a maximum of 50 pages (double-spaced),166 
and added that there should be no evidence or documentation attached. As in 
Aguas Argentina/Vivendi 2, the Tribunal did not make a decision on the principle 
of access to documents related to the case, noting that it did not consider such 
access necessary “for the time being.”167 The Tribunal thus in practice refused 
such access, without expressing a general, abstract position on the issue.
163 Id. at para. 17 (emphasis added).
164 Id. at para. 46.
165 Id. at para. 50.
166 Interestingly, no precision is given, as was done in Aguas Argentina/Vivendi 2, as to the size of the 
font! See supra note 153 and accompanying text for information on the latter case’s imposition of such a 
requirement.
167 Biwater, supra note 93, Award at para. 65.
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With regard to access to hearings, the Tribunal strictly applied the new 
Article 37(2) of the ICsID Arbitration Rules, which allows such access “unless 
either party objects.” In light of the objection presented by the Claimant, the 
Tribunal had no alternative but to deny the petitioners access to the hearings. 
It is necessary to point out, however, that the Tribunal believed it was prudent 
to add that it “reserve[d] the right to ask the Petitioners specific questions in 
relation to their written submission, and to request the filing of further written 
submissions and/or documents or other evidence, which might assist in better 
understanding the Petitioners’ position, whether before or after the hearing.”168 
This statement in turn led two authors to point out that this left the door half-
open to participation by the amici in the hearings.169 The matter was again 
raised before the hearings that were to take place in The hague on April 21, 
2007, and the Tribunal questioned the parties on that occasion and accepted 
their joint position:
By reference to its Procedural Order No 5, the Arbitral Tribunal asked 
the Parties how they intended to deal with the Amici brief, and whether 
they considered that any further intervention of the Amici was necessary. 
The Parties expressed the following agreement:
i. that they will address the issues raised by the Amici in their final 
oral submissions;
ii. that no further intervention of the Amici in these proceedings is 
necessary.170
In conclusion, it must be noted that after having entered into WTO Dispute 
settlement procedures, and having expanded into investor-state arbitration 
under nAFTA, friends of the court are now accepted actors in investment 
arbitrations pursued under the ICsID Rules.
Iv. OBsERvATIOns On ThE CREATIOn AnD EvOLUTIOn OF 
InTERnATIOnAL ECOnOMIC LAW
It may be useful now to review carefully the interactions between 
jurisprudential activity and what could be referred to as international legislative 
activity. It has to be noted that when the tribunal’s hands are tied by a very clear 
rule and it cannot interpret it with some flexibility, it is essential, for the law to 
evolve, that the “international legislative power” intervene in order to modify 
168 Id. at para. 72.
169 Grisel and vinuales, supra note 4, at 21.
170 Biwater, supra note 93, Procedural Order no. 6 (Amicus and post hearing process), at para. 3.
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the rule. In other words, states must decide on the adoption of new rules. When 
the wording of a rule leaves some room for interpretation, however, the role of 
the arbitral tribunal as initiator, and even creator, of new rules of law becomes 
crucial. These subtle interactions can be highlighted in the three areas to which 
the petitions generally submitted by friends of the court are related.
A. The Trend Toward Open Public Hearings
1. A WTO Practice That respects All Sovereignties Involved
The major change in WTO practice to accommodate the demands of civil 
society was undertaken during the long-lasting Hormones case. This comes as 
no surprise, given that public health issues were at the heart of the case.
The first step was taken by the Panel, which opened up the proceedings 
on september 12–13, 2005, through a closed-circuit broadcast. This first such 
move in the WTO’s ten-year history was due to the agreement of all three 
disputing parties—the EU, the U.s. and Canada. The session of september 14 
was closed, however, since not all of the third-parties in the case intervening that 
day (i.e. Australia, Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, India, Mexico, new Zealand, 
norway) were similarly willing to open the proceedings to the public. At the 
Appellate Body level, the proceedings were again broadcast through closed-
circuit television after the parties requested this procedure. The public hearing 
was also likewise cut whenever China or Brazil intervened, since these states did 
not accept a public hearing.
Parties, nGOs and lawyers have considered this developing practice to be 
of the utmost importance in bringing transparency to WTO dispute settlement 
processes. After the breakthrough in the Hormones case, it has indeed become 
a common practice to hold open hearings whenever the states Parties so agree. 
For example, an open hearing has been held on this basis at the Appellate Body 
in a dispute between the EU and the U.s., on the issue of the zeroing of anti-
dumping duties.
2. An Imminent Amendment under NAFTA?
A definite trend is underway within nAFTA, where the United states 
and Canada are, as is well known, in favor of maximum transparency, and 
where Mexico has gradually accepted and become less reluctant to accept a 
certain degree of openness in Chapter 11 proceedings. In the Methanex171 
171 Methanex Corp. v. United States, supra note 47.
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and UPS172 cases, the Tribunals authorized open hearings following consent 
by both parties. The hearings were broadcast live from the World Bank’s 
headquarters.173 Case law was therefore established to the effect that hearings 
may be open to the public once the parties are in agreement. however, 
contrary to the wishes of the two aforementioned states, there is still no rule 
requiring open hearings.
The difficulty for this rule’s evolution stemmed from the initial opposition 
by Mexico to open hearings, which explains why the statement of Interpretation 
adopted by the nAFTA Free Trade Commission in 2001 did not authorize 
public access to arbitration hearings under nAFTA Chapter 11.174 This is so, 
despite progress having been made with regard to access to documentation, 
which in turn led to less confidentiality. It may further be noted that although 
the legal principles governing nAFTA do not currently grant a right of access to 
hearings by those who are not parties to the arbitration, it has been noted that 
in practice, arbitration hearings involving Canada and the United states are in 
fact open to the public.175
Mexico is itself gradually evolving toward acceptance of public hearings, 
under pressure from its partners and public opinion. An additional step was taken 
in the Joint statement of the Parties of July 16, 2004,176 which suggested a more 
widespread acceptance of transparency when it stated that “[we] were pleased 
Mexico has now joined Canada and the United states in supporting open hearings 
for investor-state disputes. In addition, we have agreed that the same degree of 
openness should apply to proceedings under the Dispute settlement provisions 
of Chapter 20 of the nAFTA, and asked officials to develop rules governing open 
hearings for such proceedings.” There is no doubt, therefore, that the amendment 
of the rule on open hearings in the nAFTA context could be imminent.
172 UPS, supra note 50. Both the hearings on jurisdiction (July 29–30, 2002) and on the merits 
(December 12–17, 2005) were open to the public.
173 The same solution was adopted in the Canfor case, in which the Arbitral Tribunal authorized, with 
the consent of the parties to the dispute, the holding of an open hearing which was also broadcast live 
(December 7–9, 2004). With respect to the consolidated cases, Canfor Corp. v. United States of Amercia, 
Tembec. Inc. et al. v. United States of America and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. United States of America, 
the transcripts of the hearing, which was held on January 11, 2006, were made available to the public. See 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c14432.htm. (On september 7, 2005, the Tribunal that was appointed to decide 
the United states’ request ordered the consolidation of the three cases.)
174 statements of Interpretation, including this one, can be found on the website of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Canada, at http://www.dfait-maeci-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/nAFTA-Interpr-en.asp. It 
can be noted that it would have been difficult to “interpret” the arbitration rules differently in the face of 
explicit provisions which did not authorize public access.
175 Kinnear, supra note 32.
176 Mexico announced its support for open hearings in investor-state disputes following the 2004 
nAFTA Commission Meeting. See nAFTA Free Trade Commission, “Decade of Achievement,” Joint 
statement (July 16, 2004), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/Js-sanAntonio-en.asp
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3. A Minor Amendment to the ICSID Arbitration rules on Open Hearings
Pursuant to the clear rule set forth in Article 32 of the ICsID Arbitration 
Rules, it has been noted in this article that tribunals had no alternative but to 
refuse nGOs access to hearings. The states intervened at this point, albeit while 
exercising extreme caution. Reluctant to grant civil society too much access 
to international arbitration fora, they decided to overturn the presumption 
applicable to hearings, so that while it traditionally appeared to be understood 
that hearings were open to the parties only, except where otherwise agreed by 
the parties, this principle was amended in the new ICsID Rules that came into 
force on February 1, 2006.177 Although the new rule set forth in Article 32 of 
the current Rules is practically the same as that of the Rules’ previous version, 
it is important to note the major change in perspective introduced by the new 
wording. The new Article 32 states as follows:
Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the 
secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their 
agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their 
testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part 
of the hearings, subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. The 
Tribunal shall for such cases establish procedures for the protection of 
proprietary or privileged information.
We see now that the principle is one in favor of open hearings, unless 
one of the parties expresses a clear objection thereto. Tribunals now have an 
opportunity to decide whether hearings will be open to the public, except where 
there is an explicit rejection by one of the parties. This development is similar 
to that which led to the replacement of positive consensus, which held sway 
during the time of the GATT, with negative consensus, which has now become 
the norm adopted within the WTO dispute settlement system.
The possibility that in camera hearings will gradually become a thing of 
the past cannot be ruled out, at least with regard to those arbitrations to which 
177 On the reform of ICsID’s Arbitration Rules, see A. Cohen smutny and A.E. serran, “The 
Amended ICsID Rules—In Brief,” Global Arb. Rev. 29 (August 2006); L. McDougall and A. santens, 
“ICsID Amends its Arbitration Rules,” Int’ Arb. L. Rev. 119 (no. 4, 2006); M. Kantor, “new 
Amendments to ICsID’s Arbitration Rules,” stockholm Int’l Arb. Rev., 213 (2006); B. Legum, “La 
réforme du CIRDI—vers une juridictionnalisation de l’arbitrage transnational?”, in F. horchani, (ed.), 
Où va le droit de l’investissement ? Désordre normatif et recherche d’équilibre 283, Paris, Pedone (2006) 
(hereinafter Legum); A.R. Parra, “The 2006 Amendments of the ICsID Arbitration Rules,” Zeitschrift 
für schiedsverfahren 247 (september/October 2006).
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states favoring such openness are parties. several investment documents have 
introduced a requirement to hold open hearings. For example, mention can 
be made here of Article 29.2 of the new United states bilateral investment 
treaty model,178 which states that “[t]he tribunal shall conduct hearings open 
to the public and shall determine, in consultation with the disputing parties, 
the appropriate logistical arrangements.” It bears noting that this principle 
is not incompatible with the rule set forth in Article 32 of the ICsID Rules, 
as the latter leaves the decision of whether to hold open or closed hearings 
to the agreement of the parties. It should therefore be considered that when 
arbitration is carried out pursuant to a treaty establishing open hearings as 
a rule, the states Parties have conditioned their consent upon transparency 
and therefore the investor must be considered as having consented to the 
transparency provisions simply by initiating the proceedings pursuant to that 
agreement.
The caution exercised by states within the ICsID context is attributable to 
each state being allowed great flexibility in this type of arbitration. There is a 
large number of states Parties to the ICsID Convention which do not all share 
the same conceptions regarding questions of confidentiality in international 
arbitration.
B. The Trend Toward Acceptance of Amicus Curiae Briefs
The first point that should be highlighted is the alacrity with which a “general 
case law” for amicus curiae interventions in international investment law was 
established, based on the position taken by the WTO Appellate Body, even 
though this latter opening up to amici curiae within an interstate framework 
was based on extremely fragile legal foundations. As Catherine Kessedjian 
noted, “[t]he use of the amicus curiae mechanism is a fascinating development in 
recent years in judicial processes around the world.”179 There is no question that 
the arbitral tribunals that accepted amicus curiae briefs in arbitrations between 
states and private individuals relied heavily on the reasoning of the WTO 
Appellate Body.180 Others have also pointed to this influence, including Eric 
Teynier, who in underscoring this point noted that it was interesting to observe 
that the Arbitral Tribunals in Methanex and Aguas Argentinas had expressly made 
reference, by way of precedent, to the recognition of amicus curiae interventions 
178 This document can be found at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/
section_Index.html
179 Kessedjian, “sir Kenneth,” supra note 4, at 9.
180 I first pointed this out in an article published in 2002. stern, supra note 28.
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by the WTO on the basis of a similar reasoning.181 Once the judgments of 
international arbitral tribunals had clearly established the doctrine, it was up to 
states to adopt the resulting principles.
1. The Very Negative reaction of Almost All WTO States
Even at the meeting at which the DsB182 adopted the Appellate Body’s 
ruling in Shrimp-Turtle, and despite the ambiguity of that ruling, many voices 
were raised in criticism of what some governments regarded as an abuse of 
authority by the Appellate Body.183 It is worth reproducing a few passages from 
the minutes in full.
According to Thailand, “[w]ith regard to the procedural issues, it was apparent 
that the Appellate Body had used this case to extend its authority beyond that 
granted to it under the WTO Agreement …. [h]is delegation believed that 
Members, not the Appellate Body, should decide the extent to which NGOs might be 
involved in a dispute settlement process …. The Appellate Body’s conclusion … 
had defied the rights and obligations of Members and the basic intention under 
the DsU …. Thailand was also concerned that the ‘evolutionary’ interpretative 
approach newly adopted by the Appellate Body was a formula for adding to or 
diminishing the rights and obligations of Members ….”184
According to Pakistan, “the DsU did not give nGOs the right to submit 
amicus briefs or give Members permission to attach briefs to their submissions 
that did not reflect their views …. The Appellate Body had disregarded the 
jurisdictional limits agreed by Members …. Those Members who had negotiated 
the DSU were aware that it had never been intended to permit NGOs to submit 
amicus briefs to panels and to the Appellate Body..”185
According to India, “[t]he Panel had interpreted the word ‘seek’ in Article 
13 of the DsU fully in accordance with the general rule of interpretation of the 
vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, i.e., that a treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
contained therein. The word ‘seek,’ in its ordinary meaning, implied a pro-
active search on the part of the subject, which in this case was the Panel .... The 
Appellate Body had alleged that the Panels’ reading of the word ‘seek’ was too 
181 Teynier, supra note 83, at 20, para. 2.
182 As a reminder, “DsB” stands for “Dispute settlement Body” and “DsU” stands for “Dispute 
settlement Understanding.”
183 WTO DsB, Meeting of november 6, 1998, WT/DsB/M/50 (December 14, 1998), at http://
www.wto.org/index.htm
184 Id. at pp. 2–4 (emphasis added).
185 Id. at p. 5 (emphasis added).
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formal and technical .... India, therefore, believed that the Appellate Body might 
have interpreted one of the important provisions of DSU loosely and wrongly, which 
could upset the balance of rights and obligations of Members.”186
Mexico also expressed concern about the systemic consequences of the 
Appellate Body’s ruling, stating that “[t]he Appellate Body’s findings, in 
particular … had paved the way for diverse groups not related to the WTO 
to become active participants in proceedings, with the result that cases would be 
discussed at a political level at the expense of argumentation of a legal nature.”187
hong Kong, China, “was concerned that the ruling might open up the 
floodgate of non-requested submissions which would in turn have serious implications 
on the work of future panels in terms of workload and efficiency.”188
Later, at the time of the DsB’s adoption of the Appellate Body report in United 
States-Carbon Steel, governments again expressed critical points of view.189
In particular, the European Communities considered that “the way the 
Appellate Body had dealt with the issue of amicus curiae briefs was not entirely 
satisfactory …. [T]he Appellate Body had concluded that it had the legal 
authority under the DsU to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs in an 
appeal in which it found it pertinent to do so. however, the Appellate Body did 
not provide any guidance under what circumstances it might find it pertinent 
to consider amicus curiae briefs nor how this would be reflected in its Working 
Procedures.”190
It was the United states that expressed the most enthusiasm for the positions 
taken by the Appellate Body concerning its authority to accept amicus curiae 
briefs at the appeal stage. While declaring itself to be disappointed with the 
ruling on the merits in United States-Carbon Steel, it approved of the procedural 
findings: “however, there was one positive aspect of the Appellate Body Report, 
namely, its finding that the Appellate Body had the authority to take into account 
submissions by interested private parties, so-called amicus curiae briefs.”191
Argentina, on the contrary, gave vent to its concerns:
The dispute settlement system established intergovernmental procedures 
and the authority to accept and consider unsolicited briefs submitted by 
individuals or organizations, not Members of the WTO, could distort 
186 Id. at pp. 7–8 (emphasis added).
187 Id. at p. 14 (emphasis added).
188 Id. at p. 16 (emphasis added).
189 WTO DsB, Meeting of June 7, 2000, WT/DsB/M/83 (June 7, 2000), at http://www.wto.org/
index.htm
190 Id. at para. 5 (emphasis added).
191 Id. at para. 8.
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the character of dispute settlement procedures. Access to the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure was restricted to WTO Members and 
panels, and the Appellate Body only had a duty to consider submissions 
from parties or third parties in a given dispute.192
In addition, the representative of hong Kong, China, put forward an 
important argument when he pointed out that the authority which the Appellate 
Body had arrogated to itself was not one of the procedural powers conferred 
upon it by Article 17.9 of the DsU: “To justify its claim, the Appellate Body had 
relied upon its interpretation of Article 17.9 of the DsU. however, that Article 
concerned only procedures for Appellate Review and allowed the Appellate 
Body to draw up its working procedures under certain constraints. Therefore, 
the issues to be considered in this context had to be procedural. however, the 
acceptance by the Appellate Body of amicus curiae briefs was not a procedural but 
a substantive matter. It affected the intergovernmental character of the WTO as 
well as Members’ rights and their obligations.”193
The Philippines considered that it was not the right time to take a decision 
on the subject of amicus curiae briefs since Members were still discussing the 
problem.194
similar concerns were expressed by Canada at the DsB’s meeting on 
november 17, 2000,195 during which it was decided to hold a special meeting 
of the General Council precisely to discuss the implications of the Appellate 
Body’s rulings in the Asbestos case: “In Canada’s view, it was for Members as a 
whole, not the Appellate Body, to decide how the issue of amicus participation 
should be dealt with in the future. Members had to ensure that the government-
to-government nature of the dispute settlement process was not weakened or 
compromised by the procedural initiatives of panels or the Appellate Body.”196
A special meeting of the General Council on this topic, convened at the 
request of Egypt on behalf of the informal group of developing countries, 
met on november 22, 2001.197 The meeting opened with a statement by the 
192 Id. at para. 14.
193 Id. at para. 15 (emphasis added). For a position along the same lines, cf. the following: “Brazil 
noted that the question of who could be heard by panels and the Appellate Body was not a ‘procedural 
rule,’ but rather a very substantive component of the DsU rules, which affected the way the system 
operated and significantly altered the rights and obligations Members negotiated under the Uruguay 
Round.” WTO DsB, Meeting of January 23, 2002, WT/GC/M/60, http://www.wto.org/index.htm, at 
13, para. 43.
194 Id. at para. 20 (emphasis added).
195 WTO DsB, Meeting of January 15, 2001, WT/DsB/M/92, at http://www.wto.org/index.htm
196 Id. at 25, para. 128.
197 See WTO DsB, Meeting of January 23, 2002, supra note 194.
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Chairman of the General Council in which he endorsed a previous statement by 
the Chairman of the DsB, who had said that he was convinced that no Member, 
in discussing the question of amicus briefs, wanted to harm the reputation of 
the Organization. The preliminary statement of the Chairman of the General 
Council was accompanied by a secretariat note retracing the Appellate Body’s 
various rulings on this issue.198
In reality, rather than the content of the additional procedure, what 
governments most strongly objected to was the method of disseminating 
notice of that additional procedure. As mentioned earlier, this notice had been 
published on the WTO’s website and e-mailed to nGOs on the very day on 
which the procedure had been adopted. Many Members, such as India, regarded 
this as an outright invitation to submit amicus briefs. Thus, in the statement 
it made in the course of the meeting, India denounced the Appellate Body’s 
approach in the following terms:
[I]t was not unfair to conclude that the Appellate Body knew, or at least 
should have known, that putting the additional procedure on the WTO 
web site, which was said to have been designed to discipline the process 
and was supposed to have been adopted for the particular appeal only, 
would virtually amount to an invitation to hundreds of nGOs to file 
amicus curiae briefs.199
It is symptomatic that in the course of this extraordinary meeting, out of the 
representatives of 24 countries and 6 groups of countries200 that took the floor, 
only one—the representative of the United states—approved of the Appellate 
Body’s decision to adopt an additional procedure.
Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of the new procedure, it would 
seem difficult for the WTO to go into reverse on the question of the admission 
of amicus curiae briefs, particularly as it is obvious that the position taken by 
the Appellate Body has spilled over into other international-dispute fora, as has 
been seen all along this article.
In reality, it may be true that governments could adopt clear rules prohibiting 
the admission of non-requested amicus curiae briefs if and when the dispute 
settlement mechanism is reviewed at a Ministerial Conference. From a political 
198 WTO DsB, “Factual Background note Relating to the Issue Raised by Certain Members,” http://
www.wto.org/index.htm
199 WTO DsB, Meeting of January 23, 2002, supra note 193, at 9, para. 35.
200 Egypt acted on behalf of the informal group of developing countries, Colombia on behalf of 
the Andean countries, singapore on behalf of AsEAn, hungary on behalf of seven Central European 
countries, and the European Communities acted for its members.
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point of view, however, considering the strength of international feelings and 
the WTO’s desire to establish its credibility in the eyes of civil society, it would 
seem difficult to oppose directly the movement initiated by the Appellate Body. 
There can in any event be no denying that if in the future, by a decision of 
the Members of the WTO, nGOs were to be refused access to the dispute 
settlement system via amicus curiae briefs, this would mean a setback for civil 
society relative to the present situation, and the credibility of the system would 
be seriously impaired.
2. The Acceptance of Amicus Curiae Briefs by States in the NAFTA Context
The trend toward state acceptance of amici curiae briefs within the 
context of investor-state arbitration began under nAFTA, where it could 
be said that two-thirds of the states were well known from the beginning 
to be in favor of this procedure. One state, Mexico, was very hostile from 
the outset, particularly because this procedure was not a part of its domestic 
legislation. however, Mexico has evolved in this regard, as pointed out by 
Mr. hugo Perezcano:201
Mexico, which had initially opposed amicus curiae participation, filed 
a brief submission in the Methanex case, which was not even our case, 
saying that the nAFTA rules did not allow for amicus curiae participation 
…. Mexico has moved from a position totally opposed to amicus curiae 
participation to a more open analysis as to the kind of procedures that we 
are facing, and it is moving toward more transparency …. A … step has 
recently been taken by the nAFTA Parties providing for amicus curiae 
participation and setting out clear rules as to how that participation has 
to take place. so it is a working process.202
It has already been stated above that it was the arbitrators who established 
the principle of accepting briefs from friends of the court in the Methanex and 
UPS cases in 2001. This trend was then adopted and embodied in the “note of 
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions” adopted by the nAFTA Free 
Trade Commission in October 2003. This document contains a “statement on 
non-disputing party participation”:
201 Mr. Perezcano served as General Counsel for Trade negotiations, secretariat of the Economy, 
Mexico.
202 This statement was made on the occasion of a discussion transcribed in 5 J. World Invest. & Trade 
(2004), at 347–348.
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no provision of the north American Free Trade Agreement (“nAFTA”) 
limits a Tribunal’s discretion to accept written submissions from a person 
or entity that is not a disputing party (a “non-disputing party”).203
Although friends of the court thus appeared to be an established part of the 
proceedings for settling international economic disputes under nAFTA, and 
this ensured a certain degree of transparency in such proceedings, it should be 
recalled that “[t]ransparency is not anarchy,”204 and that it would be necessary to 
structure their interventions. Therefore, following the landmark rulings by the 
Tribunals in the Methanex and UPS cases, the nAFTA Free Trade Commission, 
in its aforementioned statement of October 7, 2003, established the procedural 
framework that should in the future be followed by tribunals presiding over 
disputes under nAFTA.205
Once this procedure was adopted by the states,206 the arbitrators largely 
exercised the power to accept briefs from friends of the court in accordance 
with the stipulated procedure. In the Joint statement by the nAFTA Free 
Trade Commission of July 16, 2004 entitled “A Decade of Achievement,” the 
Commission noted that “[w]e are pleased that the transparency initiatives we 
took during our October 7, 2003 meeting in Montreal have already begun 
to improve the operation of the investment chapter’s investor-state dispute-
settlement mechanism. Earlier this year, for the first time a tribunal accepted 
written submissions from a non-disputing party and adopted the procedures that 
we recommended following our meeting in Montreal, for the handling of such 
submissions.” Indeed, in the Methanex case, the Tribunal adopted on December 
30, 2003 the procedures indicated by the nAFTA Free Trade Commission, and 
on January 30, 2004 authorized the submission of applications for intervention 
by friends of the court. This led the International Institute for sustainable 
Development (IIsD) to note on its website that “[i]nternational investment law 
history is made!”207 On March 9, 2004, two applications for intervention were 
203 nAFTA Free Trade Commission, “statement on non-Disputing Party Participation,” in note of 
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (October 2003), at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-
alena/Js-sanAntonio-en.asp
204 L. Boisson de Chazournes and M. Moïse Mbengue, “The Amici Curiae and the WTO Dispute 
settlement system: the Doors Are Open,” in L. and Prac. of Int’l Cts. and Tribs., vol. 2, no. 2, 205–248, 
at 230, The hague, nijhoff (2003).
205 One specific aspect of this procedure should be noted, however, namely that it provides for opening 
up the proceeding only to an amicus curiae that is a national of a party, or has a significant presence in the 
territory of a party.
206 “nafta Commission statement on Amicus Curiae Participation in Arbitrations,” in s. Murphy, 
“Contemporary Practice of the United states Relating to International Law,” 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 841–842 
(October 2004).
207 http://www.iisd/pdf/2003/trade_methanex
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respectively submitted by IIsD and another group of three nGOs,208 and these 
were accepted by the Tribunal after receiving the approval of the two parties.209 
It seems that Canada was very hesitant and finally gave its approval only after 
strong pressure was applied by nGOs.
nevertheless, the question of what will be more likely to happen in reality if 
a party expressly objects to an amicus curiae intervention has perhaps not been 
fully resolved. Indeed, in a letter addressed to the parties on April 9, 2004, the 
president of the Methanex Tribunal wrote as follows:
I acknowledge safe receipt of the two letters dated 26th March 2004 
from Methanex and the United states regarding their respective non-
objection to and acceptance of the “amici” applications …. In the 
circumstances, the Tribunal allows both applications ….210
The fact remains that, from a legal standpoint, a nAFTA tribunal now has 
the power to disregard an objection by one or even both parties.
3. The Introduction of an Article on Amicus Curiae in the ICSID rules
It took less than a year for the first decision of an ICsID tribunal accepting 
the principle of amicus curiae interventions to take shape in a new rule, 
incorporated in a rather artificial manner in the second paragraph of Article 37 
of the ICsID Arbitration Rules. The reason for this incorporation was certainly 
to avoid re-numbering all the subsequent rules, adjusting cross-references, 
and making the work of the secretariat and the arbitrators more complicated. 
Article 37, entitled before the change “visits and Inquiries,” was entitled after 
the change “visits and Inquiries; submissions of non-disputing Parties”:
After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity 
that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “non-disputing 
party”) to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter 
within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to allow such 
a filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to 
which:
208 These nGOs were the Bluewater network, Communities for a Better Environment, and the 
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL).
209 See nafta Commission statement on Amicus Curiae Participation in Arbitrations, supra note 
206.
210 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Letter to the parties from the president of the Tribunal (April 9, 
2004), at http://state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm (emphasis added).
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(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in 
the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding 
by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is 
different from that of the disputing parties;
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter 
within the scope of the dispute;
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the 
proceeding.
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission 
does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice 
either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present 
their observations on the non-disputing party submission.
It bears noting that the fundamental criteria stipulated by the ICsID 
Tribunals, namely the presence of a public interest and an appropriate friend, 
are not reproduced or explained as such in the new rule. It has been suggested 
that a main reason why the aforementioned “fundamental criteria” were not 
included in the new rule was that the rule was written to cover submissions made 
not only or even primarily by nGOs, etc., but also or even more importantly 
submissions by non-disputing states which would in a BIT arbitration, for 
example, typically be the other party to the BIT.
It should also be noted that the wording of the factors that a tribunal must 
take into account in order to render its decision does not include very specific 
directives in this regard. Thus, point (b) appears to be somewhat superfluous, 
insofar as it is difficult to envision a friend of the court intervening in a matter 
that is unrelated to the dispute. similarly, point (c) also appears to be irrelevant 
with regard to the decision of the tribunal, insofar as one cannot readily envision 
a non-disputing party intervening in a dispute as an amicus curiae if it does not 
have a significant interest in the matters raised in the dispute. The sole effect of 
this reference is, however, undoubtedly to state that the existence of a significant 
interest will not be presumed and will be determined by the tribunal. Point (a) 
for its part includes two pieces of useful information. First, the amicus curiae 
brief may be related to a factual or legal issue, and second, the intervention 
must bring a perspective that is different from that of the parties.
Even as arbitrators in the ICsID context began to accept briefs from friends of 
the court, it was evident that this trend was contingent upon prior developments 
in other fora. Thus, it has often been pointed out, as was done by Eric Teynier 
in his comments on the Aguas Argentinas case, that the required content of 
a request to intervene is almost identical to that set out in the statement of 
October 7, 2003 issued by the nAFTA Free Trade Commission on third-party 
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participation, which served as the basis for accepting amicus curiae briefs in 
the Methanex and UPS cases. This statement was in turn directly based on the 
ad hoc procedure for intervention applications developed on March 12, 2001 
by the WTO Appellate Body in the Asbestos case.211 It should be mentioned 
here, however, that scholarship also at times plays a fairly important role in 
the evolution of this field of law. In the Asbestos case, for example, the criteria 
initially selected by the WTO Appellate Body were largely based on those set 
out in a scholarly article.212
4. Toward a Widespread Acceptance of Amicus Curiae Briefs and a “Dilution” 
of Their role
The acceptance of briefs submitted by friends of the court has not 
remained limited to nAFTA and ICsID. In the “new generation of investment 
agreements,”213 reference to amicus curiae interventions has become the norm. 
This has been the case for a number of free trade agreements (FTAs) signed 
by the United states in recent years,214 for Canada’s new Foreign Investment 
Protection Agreements (FIPAs) program,215 and for the new United states 
model bilateral investment treaty (Articles 28 and 29).216
It appears that the OECD Members were somewhat more cautious than the 
nAFTA states Parties, as the statement by the OECD’s Investment Committee, 
adopted in June 2005 and entitled “Transparency and Third Party Participation 
in Investor-state Dispute settlement Procedures,” simply stated that
211 Teynier, supra note 83, at 22, para. 8.
212 G. Marceau and M. stilwell, “Practical suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO 
Adjudicating Bodies,” J. Int’l Econ. L. 155–187 (2001).
213 This was the expression used by Katia Yannaca-small in OECD, “Transparency and Third Party 
Participation in Investor-state Dispute settlement Procedures,” supra note 158, at 7.
214 United states-Chile Free Trade Agreement signed on June 6, 2003, entered into force on January 
1, 2004; United states-singapore Free Trade Agreement signed on May 6, 2003, entered into force on 
January 1, 2004; United states-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), signed on January 
28, 2004 and ratified by the U.s. senate on July 27, 2005 (Article 10.20: “The tribunal shall have the 
authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing 
party,” but also Article 20.11: “A Party that is not a disputing Party, on delivery of a written notice to 
the disputing Parties, shall be entitled to attend all hearings, to make written and oral submissions to the 
panel, and to receive written submissions of the disputing Parties in accordance with the Model Rules of 
Procedure. Those submissions shall be reflected in the final report of the panel.”); United states-Morocco 
Free Trade Agreement, signed on June 15, 2004, entered into force on January 1, 2006.
215 Information on this program is available at http://www.international.gc.ca/tna-nac/what_fipa-fr.
asp
216 See Us Model BIT, Art. 28.3: “The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus 
curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.” http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
Trade_sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf
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[t]he Members of the Investment Committee generally share the view 
that especially insofar as proceedings raise important issues of public 
interest, it may also be desirable to allow third party participation, 
subject however to clear and specific guidelines.217
This passage reveals a certain degree of ambiguity in the recently 
introduced vocabulary for amicus matters, not only in the ICsID Arbitration 
Rules, which refer to “non-disputing parties,” but also in the various other 
documents mentioned above. These include the statement of Interpretation 
adopted by the nAFTA Free Trade Commission in October 2003, which 
undoubtedly pertains to amicus curiae briefs submitted by non-parties, and 
which utilizes expressions that may lead to some confusion, for example “non-
disputing party” and “third party.” The OECD statement for its part refers 
also to “third parties.” Perhaps this trend in the language should be viewed as 
a sort of Freudian slip which recognizes that in the final analysis, despite the 
evident denials of the arbitral tribunals that refused to consider friends of the 
court as parties, everything was happening as if there were indeed new parties 
intervening in the arbitration.
This sort of trend toward the inclusion of friends of the court in the same 
category as parties to the dispute, with friends of the court now almost routinely 
being referred to as “third parties,” is further illustrated by the fact that a 
controversy developed between the friends of the court and the parties to the 
dispute in the Methanex case. This led to the inclusion of paragraph 8 in the 
October 2003 statement from the nAFTA Free Trade Commission:
The Tribunal will render a decision on whether to grant leave to file a 
non-disputing party submission. If leave to file a non-disputing party 
submission is granted, the Tribunal will set an appropriate date by which 
the disputing parties may respond in writing to the non-disputing party 
submission. By that date, non-disputing nAFTA Parties may, pursuant 
to Article 1128, address any issues of interpretation of the Agreement 
presented in the non-disputing party submission.
While in the Methanex case, this was certainly a procedure aimed at 
guaranteeing the right of defense to the parties, it truly integrated the friends of 
the court into the heart of the proceedings. It should be added in passing that 
217 OECD Investment Committee, “Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-state 
Dispute settlement Procedures,” statement (June 2005), at http://www.oecd.org
icsid review Fall 2007 5-13-09.indd   343 5/14/09   2:49:07 PM
344 ICsID REvIEW—FOREIGn InvEsTMEnT LAW JOURnAL
although friends of the court intervene in the arbitration proceedings as non-
parties, they should be considered neither as experts218 nor as witnesses.219
In concluding this overview of the gradual introduction of the acceptance of 
briefs from friends of the court, it is important to shed light on the increasingly 
evident establishment of a global case law in international economic law 
supporting such acceptance. As has been seen earlier in this article, it all started 
in the WTO, where a procedure was adopted in the Asbestos case. Thereafter, a 
very similar procedure was adopted in the statement of Interpretation adopted 
by the nAFTA Free Trade Commission in October 2003 and in the ICsID 
arbitrations that have accepted the principle of amicus curiae.
C. Trends relating to Confidentiality and the Production of Documents
An important development has taken place with regard to confidentiality in 
international arbitration. It was observed that under nAFTA a reduction in the 
obligation of parties to preserve the confidentiality of the proceedings stemmed 
from arbitral case law,220 with the United states and Canada having developed 
the habit of providing public access to documents for the cases to which they are 
parties, particularly by disseminating them on the Internet. This trend in the case 
law was then adopted by the states. The statement of Interpretation adopted by 
the three nAFTA states Parties on July 31, 2001221 confirmed the absence of a 
duty of confidentiality governing Chapter 11 arbitrations.222 This statement of 
Interpretation, which concerned the issue of access to documents and did not 
address the issue of public access to hearings, noted in the former regard that
218 “[A]mici should not be seen as experts, even though their expertise is a determining factor in the 
choice whether or not to accept their submissions.” newcombe and Lemaire, supra note 28, at 26. See also 
Grisel and vinuales, supra note 4, at 6, in which the authors state that “amicus curiae status is not to be 
confused with that of an expert, as the modern amicus curiae typically seeks to advance a cause that he or 
she claims to represent. his or her action therefore goes well beyond the mere provision of assistance to the 
tribunal regarding issues of fact or law, and becomes a real expression of a position vis-à-vis issues raised by 
the dispute in question. The amicus thus plays an ambiguous role, varying between disinterested assistance 
in respect of the conduct of the proceedings and the taking of an open position, and also at times acting 
in the same manner in relation to the arguments of the parties.”
219 “nor can amici be regarded as witnesses …. [A]mici seek, contrary to witnesses, to defend the 
public interest, and must refrain from favouring the private interest of a party.” newcombe and Lemaire, 
supra note 28, at 27.
220 Ben hamida, supra note 83, at para. 816. See also F. Fracassi, “Confidentiality and nAFTA 
Chapter 11 Arbitrations,” Can. J. Int’l L. 213–222 (2001).
221 A similar note was signed on October 31, 2002 by Canada and Chile to clarify certain provisions 
of Chapter G (on investment) of the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement. This note, available at 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/bilateral-f.asp#01c, reproduces the provisions of the statement of 
Interpretation adopted under nAFTA.
222 Ben hamida, supra note 83, at para. 817. It should be noted that the publication of documents 
was first permitted during the period 1995–1996 for state-to-state disputes under nAFTA Chapter 20.
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[n]othing in the nAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on 
the disputing Parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, subject to 
the application of Article 1137(4), nothing in the nAFTA precludes 
the Parties from providing public access to documents submitted to, or 
issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal.
With regard to such developments, some made a point of highlighting even 
more subtle interactions than those already mentioned, between the case law and 
the evolution of international norms, between national laws and international 
rules, and between multilateral and bilateral rules. Thus, during a conference 
held in April 2004, Margrete stevens was able to demonstrate the influence 
of domestic law, and more specifically that of the United states Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), on the gradual opening-up of international arbitration, 
and on the introduction of greater transparency into proceedings,223 while also 
focusing on the interaction between awards and the interpretations of the 
nAFTA rules adopted by the states. she showed in particular very clearly that 
it was after an arbitral tribunal had declared in the Loewen case that there was no 
general principle of confidentiality to be found in the ICsID Additional Facility 
Rules or under nAFTA that could prevent the United states from enforcing the 
FOIA, and after an arbitral tribunal had stated in the Methanex case that it had 
the authority to accept amicus curiae briefs in an arbitration that took place under 
the aegis of the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules, that the two aforementioned 
statements of Interpretation were successively adopted by the states Parties to 
the nAFTA to confirm the findings of these Tribunals.224 national approaches 
persist, however, since following these two interpretations by the nAFTA 
states Parties, “the United states has incorporated novel provisions in its recent 
Free Trade agreements and in its 2004 draft model bilateral investment treaty 
reflecting these developments, as well as going further. The new provisions 
require that the public have access to all pleadings; that hearings be open; and 
provide that tribunals may receive amicus briefs from third parties.”225
All the dialectical subtlety of the creation of norms at the international level 
was therefore brought to the fore by Margrete stevens through her description 
223 See in particular her remark that “the Freedom of Information Act has been path-breaking in 
opening up investor-state arbitration processes to third parties in nAFTA arbitrations.” M. stevens, “The 
Right to Information and Investor-state Disputes: the Development of a new Procedural Framework 
in nAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations,” Presentation, Conference entitled “International Economic 
Disputes—A Wider Perspective” 12 (st John’s College, Cambridge, United Kingdom, April 1–3, 2004) 
(unpublished). This document was provided to me by the speaker, to whom I am grateful.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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of these various interactions. Indeed, it is worth noting that what has occurred 
in the area examined in this study illustrates the variety of interactions caused 
by globalization: interactions between the domestic legal orders and the 
international legal order; interactions between various institutions such as the 
WTO, nAFTA and ICsID, within which international economic disputes are 
settled; and interactions between awards issued, doctrine and legal writing as 
well as international rules and regulations that have, for example, been clearly 
codified with respect to the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in the context of 
international investment arbitration.
v. COnCLUDInG REMARKs
some have asked: “Do investor-state arbitral tribunals really need friends?”226 
This sort of question may also be posed in respect of trade disputes between 
states in the context of the WTO. some perceive the new role granted to private 
parties as a blow to state sovereignty, while others believe that sovereignty has 
been strengthened by this development,227 with states now relying on the 
expertise of civil society to enhance their credibility through state decision-
making that is more widely participatory and accepted.
It is evident that recent developments are responding to new needs stemming 
from the enhanced role of an “obligatory jurisdiction” of states to implement 
free trade within the WTO, and also from the evolution of arbitration between 
states and investors, the nature of which has significantly changed.228
Freedom of trade, the founding tenet of the WTO, has entailed significant 
disruptions to the pre-GATT equilibrium, although it has been acknowledged 
that the overall gain for humanity stemming from free trade should prove 
to be greater than the loss. nevertheless, anything that is now connected to 
international trade rules and regulations concerns all global economic actors and 
has a potential impact on everyone’s life.229 Issues discussed in the WTO raise 
226 newcombe and Lemaire, supra note 28, at 23.
227 See, e.g., D. hollis, “Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for 
the Retention of state sovereignty,” 25 Boston Coll. Int’l and Comp. L. Rev. 235-255 (2002).
228 Thomas Wälde even goes as far as stating that “investment arbitration is not really arbitration. It is 
an international judicial review of governmental conduct which—failing a better solution, at the moment—
takes on and uses the rules, culture and community of international commercial arbitration.” Wälde, supra 
note 28, at 337. See also B. stern, “Le consentement à l’arbitrage CIRDI en matière d’investissement 
international : que disent les travaux préparatoires ?”, in Mélanges Philippe Kahn, souveraineté étatique 
et marchés internationaux à la fin du xxème siècle 223–244, Paris, Litec (2000).
229 See R. Mackenzie, “The Amicus Curiae in International Courts: Towards Common Procedural 
Approaches?”, in T. Treves et al. (eds.), Civil society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies, 295–
311, at 298, The hague, T.M.C. Asser Press (2005).
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the problem of linkages between trade liberalization, which is the key objective, 
and other needs in important areas such as health protection, environmental 
preservation and cultural diversity, to name but a few of the concerns often 
cited by nGOs that intervene in the context of the WTO.
similarly, arbitration based on bilateral and multilateral investment 
protection treaties has clearly played a role in the tremendous strides toward 
a widespread quasi-obligatory arbitration system for all investment-related 
matters involving states, which comes into play at the initiative of the investors. 
In other words, there has been a progression from a consensual commercial 
arbitration system between two parties connected by contractual links to a 
completely different quasi-obligatory international arbitration system to which 
investors may seek recourse, once they deem that an action by the state, on 
whose territory they have invested, poses a serious threat to their economic 
interests. It is therefore clear that not only problems involving disputes between 
contracting parties are at stake, but also that issues related to various regulatory 
state actions directly related to the public interest may be raised in this new 
type of arbitration. Authors have thus pointed out that “[t]he participation of 
the amici curiae in investor-state arbitration is … consistent with the changing 
nature of investor-state arbitrations and the complex issues of public policies 
that tribunals are increasingly being called upon to address.”230 similarly, 
it was also stated that “this system, which was traditionally based on private 
legitimacy arising from the consent of the parties, seems to now be in search of 
public legitimacy, which it is thought can be obtained from a certain degree of 
openness to civil society.”231
The question remains whether the trend will continue and target other 
areas. Will amici curiae also be called upon to intervene in disputes between two 
private parties? nothing should preclude this from happening, if these disputes 
involve public interests. Authors have therefore noted that while an amici curiae 
intervention in proceedings involving a state appeared to be logical, this did 
not, however, mean that it should be excluded from commercial arbitration 
between private parties, and that whenever there was a possibility that a dispute 
might have significant public repercussions, the issue of amici curiae should at 
least be raised.232
230 newcombe and Lemaire, supra note 28, at 40.
231 Grisel and vinuales, supra note 4, at 3.
232 Id. at 27, and more generally at 26–28 for a discussion of the UnCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
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similarly, one may well wonder whether this trend could also affect ICsID 
annulment committees.233 A positive response should be provided, in my view, 
if the annulment procedure at issue raises questions of public interest.
Evidently, globalization places economic issues at the heart of the matter. 
The new dimensions of the settlement of economic disputes between states, 
caused by its “jurisdictionalization”234 and the modern scale of investor-state 
arbitration, explain the demands of civil society and justify their accommodation 
and close control. As Bart Legum has pointed out, the ICsID provisions on 
transparency will serve as a reminder to ICsID arbitrators of the public interest 
inherent in investment treaty arbitrations. he has added that ICsID arbitrators, 
mindful of this interest, will probably tend to act somewhat more like judges 
than as international commercial arbitrators.235
Placing the individual at the heart of the matter should yield positive 
results, and accepting amicus curiae briefs should reinforce the feeling within 
civil society that economic justice is being done. This was the line taken by Ian 
Brownlie with regard to the general principle of acceptance of amicus curiae 
briefs, long before the question was raised in the WTO:
Even if the individual is not given procedural capacity, a tribunal 
interested in doing justice effectively must have proper access to the 
views of individuals whose interests are directly affected whether or not 
they are parties as a matter of procedure.236
Depending on their use by WTO dispute settlement bodies and international 
arbitrators tasked with settling state-state or investor-state disputes, amicus 
curiae briefs may be a bane or a boon. It is a bane if the inevitably cumbersome 
nature of the process is focused upon, or a boon if they are seen as upholding a 
model of transparency that inspires confidence in the solutions adopted in the 
context of the settlement of international economic disputes.
233 See G. Kaufmann-Kohler, “Annulment of ICsID Awards in Contract and Treaty Arbitrations: Are 
There Differences?”, in E. Gaillard and Y. Banifatemi (eds.), Annulment of ICsID Awards 218, Paris, Iai 
Publication (2004). For a more reserved attitude, see Grisel and vinuales, supra note 4, at 44, who state 
that it has also been suggested that there is no opposition to amicus curiae submissions before ICsID ad 
hoc Annulment Committees, although evidence of a valid interest, as well as of an ability to provide a 
perspective that differs from that of a party, appears to be more difficult to provide.
234 h. Ruiz Fabri, “La juridictionnalisation du règlement des litiges économiques entre Etats,” Rev. 
de l’arb. 881 (2003).
235 Legum, supra note 177.
236 I. Brownlie, “The Individual Before Tribunals Exercising International Jurisdiction,” Int’l and 
Comp. L. Q. 719 (1962). See also sh. Rosenne, “Reflections on the Position of the Individual in Inter-
state Litigation in the International Court of Justice,” in P. sanders (ed.), International Arbitration: Liber 
Amicorum for Martin Domke 250, The hague, nijhoff (1967).
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